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Abstract
In this dissertation we try to achieve secrecy enhancement in communications by resorting to both
cryptographic and information theoretic secrecy tools and metrics. Our objective is to unify tools
and measures from cryptography community with techniques and metrics from information theory
community that are utilized to provide privacy and confidentiality in communication systems. For
this purpose we adopt encryption techniques accompanied with privacy amplification tools in order
to achieve secrecy goals that are determined based on information theoretic and cryptographic
metrics.
Every secrecy scheme relies on a certain advantage for legitimate users over adversaries viewed
as an asymmetry in the system to deliver the required security for data transmission. In all of
the proposed schemes in this dissertation, we resort to either inherently existing asymmetry in
the system or proactively created advantage for legitimate users over a passive eavesdropper to
further enhance secrecy of the communications. This advantage is manipulated by means of privacy
amplification and encryption tools to achieve secrecy goals for the system evaluated based on
information theoretic and cryptographic metrics.
In our first work discussed in Chapter 2 and the third work explained in Chapter 4, we rely on a
proactively established advantage for legitimate users based on eavesdropper’s lack of knowledge
about a shared source of data. Unlike these works that assume an error-free physical channel, in the
second work discussed in Chapter 3 correlated erasure wiretap channel model is considered. This
work relies on a passive and internally existing advantage for legitimate users that is built upon
statistical and partial independence of eavesdropper’s channel errors from the errors in the main
channel. We arrive at this secrecy advantage for legitimate users by exploitation of an authenticated
but insecure feedback channel.

ix

From the perspective of the utilized tools, the first work discussed in Chapter 2 considers a
specific scenario where secrecy enhancement of a particular block cipher called Data Encryption
standard (DES) operating in cipher feedback mode (CFB) is studied. This secrecy enhancement
is achieved by means of deliberate noise injection and wiretap channel encoding as a technique
for privacy amplification against a resource constrained eavesdropper. Compared to the first work,
the third work considers a more general framework in terms of both metrics and secrecy tools.
This work studies secrecy enhancement of a general cipher based on universal hashing as a privacy
amplification technique against an unbounded adversary. In this work we also reach to the goal of
exponential secrecy where information leakage to adversary, that is assessed in terms of mutual
information as an information theoretic measure and Eve’s distinguishability as a cryptographic
metric, decays at an exponential rate. In the second work generally encrypted data frames are
transmitted through Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) protocol to generate a common random
source between legitimate users that later on is transformed into information theoretically secure
keys for encryption by means of privacy amplification based on universal hashing.
In chapter 5, we discuss possible future works as an extension of the accomplished research in
this dissertation. Proofs of some Lemmas and Theorems are presented in Chapter 6 as Appendix.

x

Chapter 1
Introduction

In introduction we first discuss our main objectives in this dissertation and then present a brief
preview of some concepts that are required as the basis of discussion in next chapters. First of
all, a big picture that demonstrates the overall theme of this dissertation is given in Section 1.1.
In this section two major common themes threading throughout the dissertation are discussed and
then similarities and differences between different works presented in next chapters are analyzed
concentrating on these unifying ideas.
Section 1.2 provides a brief preview of some information theoretic concepts like entropy and
statistical distance that will be used throughout the dissertation. An introduction to physical layer
secrecy and wiretap channel encoder based on secrecy capacity metric is presented in Section
1.3. We describe symmetric-key encryption and block ciphered systems in Section 1.4 that also
presents a background for known plaintext attack and in particular linear cryptanalysis. In our
first work discussed in Chapter 2, wiretap channel encoding is adopted as a privacy amplification
technique along with a block ciphered system against eavesdropper. In this work secrecy capacity
is utilized to evaluate security of the whole scheme, and linear cryptanalysis is considered as the
basis of Eve’s performance analysis.
Section 1.5 explains the principle of secret key agreement with emphasis on physical layer based
secret key sharing. Section 1.6 provides a required background for privacy amplification as the
main component in most information theoretic key generation algorithms. In particular, it discusses
universal class of hash functions and randomness extractors as two major techniques for privacy
amplification. Universal hashing is utilized as the main approach for privacy amplification in our
works in Chapters 3 and 4. Note that the proposed method for key agreement in Chapter 3 lies in
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the category of physical layer based key sharing algoritms. The concept of randomness extractors
is discussed in Chapter 4 where we try to define a new notion for extracting randomness.
Section 1.7 describes some secrecy metrics including mutual information, attacker’s error probability and Eve’s distinguishability that are adopted for secrecy analysis in next chapters. We also
comparatively explain advantages and weaknesses of each one of these metrics. Mutual information as an information theoretic secrecy metric is used in all works in this dissertation to measure
secrecy of the proposed schemes. Attacker’s error probability or success rate is another metric that
is adopted to evaluate secrecy of the ciphers in the works presented in Chapters 2 and 4. Eve’s
distinguishability is a universally composable metric used by cryptography community whereby
performance of the proposed secrecy scheme in Chapter 4 is evaluated.

1.1

The Big Picture

The research on physical layer secrecy, which was initiated by Wyner’s seminal work [1], has
extended to many new problems and channel models including single-antenna, multiple-antenna,
broadcast, interference, multiple-access channels etc, and mainly involves information theory (IT)
community. On the other hand, researchers who work on ciphers, authenticated encryption etc,
and rely on provable security are from theoretical computer science (CS) and crypto community.
Both communities try to enhance secrecy, but from two different angles. The first one focuses on
physical layer based techniques and protocols and relies on information theoretic metrics to reach
perfect secrecy against unbounded adversary, but these techniques mostly require some knowledge
or assumptions about eavesdropper’s physical channel. The latter one utilizes cryptographic tools
in higher layers, and relies on complexity based metrics against resource constrained adversary.
They mainly discuss how much computationally hard it is for an adversary to mount the cryptanalysis and obtain some knowledge about system secrets.
Although IT-based security aims at reaching a stronger notion of secrecy than cryptographic
based secrecy, its main disadvantage is that it relies on physical channel conditions that is not
2

realistic in most cases. Moreover, physical layer based secrecy does not conform with end-toend or link-wise secrecy, used mainly in internet or network security, where one may have no
information about utilized communication channel or available techniques in physical layer. There
have been some works that attempted to merge techniques and notions from both communities
and achieve a stronger notion of secrecy but with lesser assumptions. In [2], Maurer exploited
privacy amplification as a cryptographic tool with correlated randomness created based on public
discussion and two-way communication model. The main advantage of Maurer’s work was that it
did not require this strong assumption that the adversary channel is noisier than the receiver one.
Nevertheless, works in this line of research still require some knowledge of physical channel.
From crypto community, Bellare et.al in [3, 4] related IT-based secrecy metrics to provable
security based on eavesdropper’s advantage. They argued that IT-based metric which amounts to
Eve’s information in terms of mutual information is a relatively weak notion of secrecy since it
resorts to the assumption that the input source has uniform distribution that is not necessarily
true in realistic scenarios. Thus, they developed a new notion of mutual information security that
requires Eve’s information to be negligible for any possible input distribution. However, in this
work privacy amplification is utilized in the context of wiretap channel which still requires some
knowledge about physical channel condition. Recently some researchers from crypto community
adopted information theoretic and statistical metrics like variational distance to measure secrecy
enhancement against adversaries with unbounded computational power [4–8].
In all security schemes, confidentiality or authentication is built upon establishing some certain advantages or asymmetry of what legitimate users share over an adversary. For instance, in
symmetric encryption Alice and Bob share a secret key that is unknown to eavesdropper where
to measure secrecy we need to quantify how much effort with what success probability it takes
for a bounded adversary to obtain the correct key. Physical layer secrecy requires a wiretapper
channel that is degraded compared to the main channel either directly or through public discussion
[1, 2, 9]. Some key extracting approaches assume that there already exists some random source of
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data shared between Alice and Bob that is partially secure from adversary rendering the required
asymmetry to the system from which a highly secure key can be derived through privacy amplification [6, 10]. Reconciliation is an important step in most key agreement algorithms to generate
this correlated randomness partially unknown to Eve that presents asymmetry in the system. This
common randomness in the system can be established by the aid of a third party which supplies additional correlated information [11], existence of a public discussion and feedback communication
[12, 13] or through existing extractable randomness in physical channel [14].
The overall theme of this dissertation is to bridge the gap between two communities: IT community and crypto community. In particular, our objective is to combine cryptographic tools and
metrics together with secrecy enhancement techniques and measures in IT-based security into a
single framework. Indeed, we try to leverage strength of both approaches to enhance secrecy in
communications. In all of these works we attempt to take advantage of the existing or created
asymmetry in favor of legitimate users over Eve by utilizing privacy amplification accompanied
with encryption.
In Chapter 2 based on our work in [15], this asymmetry is provided through cipher keys shared
between Alice and Bob about which Eve has no information. As a special case we use DES block
cipher operating in CFB mode for encryption. We add adjustable noise into generated ciphertexts,
thereby creating further difficulty for a resource constrained adversary who mounts linear cryptanalysis against this cipher. This additional hardness is manifested in reduced success probability
of linear attack that consequently in multiple frames turns Eve’s channel into a degraded version
of the main channel. It provides additional secrecy in terms of secrecy capacity, as an information
theoretic measure, that can be manipulated by a secrecy encoder applied over multiple frames to
intensify Eve’s uncertainty and deliver highly secure transmission. Therefore, secrecy encoder can
be considered as a special class of privacy amplification techniques. In this work all procedure
is performed in application layer in the context of end-to-end secrecy without any assumption on
physical channel condition.

4

In Chapter 3 based on the work in [16], a two-way communication scheme based on ARQ
mechanism exploits the authenticated but insecure feedback channel between targeted recipient and
the transmitter, to create advantage over a passive adversary whose channel is partially independent
from the main channel. We adopted a general packet erasure channel model that mostly conforms
with link-wise communication. This work relies on statistical independence of Eve’s channel from
the main channel to provide advantage for Alice and Bob when a feedback channel is utilized to
create a correlated randomness that is guaranteed to have a sufficient uncertainty on Eve’s side.
This random set shared between Alice and Bob is created over a data frame containing a large
number of packets that are encrypted using the same symmetric key. By application of privacy
amplification based on universal hashing over this generated randomness we obtain information
theoretically secure keys that can be utilized for encryption of the next data frame. As a result, this
work can be viewed as exploitation of cryptographic and information theoretic secrecy means to
further enhance security based on the created advantage through two-way communication.
The third work presented in Chapter 4 based on [17] has more similarities with our first work
since both, unlike the second work, assume an error free physical channel. In both of them encryption is used as a baseline to deliver primitive security over which applying privacy amplification
enables highly confidential message transmission. Inverse universal hashing technique adopted in
this work has similar properties with the wiretap channel encoding of the first work since both of
them cause further confusion for Eve by injecting some fresh randomness into transmitted data for
the purpose of privacy amplification.
The third work takes into account a more generalized setting than the first one in terms of metrics and secrecy approaches. In this work unlike the first one we do not specify the type of cipher instead consider a general cipher that generates key streams from cipher keys and combines
them with plaintexts. Moreover, compared to the first work that assumes there already exists a key
scheduling scheme that generates uniformly distributed keys, here we only require an initial key
source shared between Alice and Bob that is partially known to Eve. We tailor to this weak source
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of randomness as the main asymmetry in favor of legitimate users and design a key generating
scheme to extract nearly uniform keys out of it, later on being used as cipher keys. In this work
we adopt variational distance or Eve’s distinuishability as a universally composable metric from
crypto community and information leakage in terms of mutual information as a strong secrecy
metric from IT community. In terms of commonality with the second work both of them assume
a computationally unbounded passive eavesdropper distinguishing them from the first work with a
resource constrained adversary.
In summary, a common theme threading in all of these works is to establish and manipulate
secrecy advantage using cryptographic and information theoretic tools in order to achieve a higher
level of secrecy in communication evaluated on the basis of metrics from both communities.

1.2

Review of Basics on Information Theory

Information theory provides measures to quantify uncertainty of random variables [18]. Let X,
Y be two random variables, with X , Y as their sets of values, and PX (x) = P r[X = x] and
PY (y) = P r[Y = y] as their probability distributions. The entropy of X is defined as: H(X) =
P
− x∈X PX (x) log PX (x). When the logs are in base 2, entropy measures uncertainty of its out-

come in bits. H(X) takes the maximum value log |X| when X has uniform distribution, that
presents the highest randomness.
Conditional entropy is defined as: H(X|Y ) = −

P

y∈Y

PY (y)

P

x∈X

PX|Y (x|y) log PX|Y (x|y)

which measures the remaining uncertainty or randomness in X when Y is known. The mutual
information I(X; Y ) between two random variables X and Y is defined as I(X; Y ) = H(X) −
H(X|Y ) that measures the information known about X provided that Y is observed. Due to its
symmetric property I(X; Y ) = I(Y ; X). Note that both conditional entropy and mutual information take the maximum value of H(X) when X and Y are totally independent.
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Let P̃X be a uniform distribution on X . L1 distance of PX from uniform distribution is
d1 (PX , P̃X ) ,

X
x

|PX (x) − P̃X (x)|.

(1.1)

Statistical distance between two distributions is half the L1 distance between them. When statistical
distance of X from uniform distribution is at most ε, it is called that X is ε-close to uniform. When
the distribution PY of the random variable Y and the joint distribution of PX,Y are given, we get
d1 (PX,Y , P̃X × PY ) =

X

|PX,Y (x, y) − P̃X (x)PY (y)|

=

X

PY (y)

X

PY (y)d1 (PX|Y =y , P̃X ).

x,y

y

=

X
x

|PX|Y (x|y) − P̃X (x)|
(1.2)

y

Rényi entropy of order 1 + α for α > 0 is defined as [19, 20]:
X
1
H1+α (X) = − log
PX (x)1+α .
α
x

(1.3)

Then, we can define the conditional Rényi entropy as
H1+α (X|Y ) = −

X
1X
PY (y) log
PX|Y (x|y)1+α .
α y
x

(1.4)

As another measure of difference between two distributions, we can obtain distance of PX from
uniform distribution in terms of Rényi divergence of order 1 + α, for α > 0 [19]
D1+α (PX ||P̃X ) =

X PX (x)1+α
1
.
log
α
α
P̃
(x)
X
x

(1.5)

For α = 0, KL-divergence is defined as
D(PX ||P̃X ) =

X

PX (x) log

x

PX (x)
.
P̃X (x)

(1.6)

The following inequality in [21] characterizes the relationship between KL-divergence and L1
distance
1
− log d1 (PX , P̃X ) ≥ − log D(PX ||P̃X ).
2
7

(1.7)

We can define min-entropy of random variable X as




H∞ (X) = min [− log PX (x)] = − log max PX (x) .
x∈X

x∈X

(1.8)

We say that X is a k-source if H∞ (x) ≥ k, i.e. if for all x ∈ X , PX (x) ≤ 2−k .

1.3

Wiretap Channel Secrecy

The notion of perfect secrecy in information theoretic terms was introduced by Shannon [22].
Suppose that Alice tries to securely transmit a k-bit packet M to a legitimate receiver Bob across
a public channel. If M is encoded by Alice into a transmitted n-bit codeword X, perfect secrecy is
said to be achieved if I(M;X)=0; meaning that the mutual information between M and X has to be
zero. Shannon showed that in order to achieve this goal, Alice and Bob need to share k bits of the
secret keys. This requires existence of a one-time pad which is an additive cipher that Xors message
with a shared secure key of the same length of the message to generate a ciphertext. One-time pad
is a theoretical cipher that is practically impossible to implement.
In his pioneering work [1] in 1975, Wyner introduced an alternative notion of communication
known as wiretap channel coding with the general model shown in Fig. 1.1. In this model, the
legitimate parties Alice and Bob are separated by a channel called main channel, and Eve observes
information transmitted by Alice through a channel called wiretapper’s channel, where these two
channels are supposed to be discrete memoryless channels (DMCs). k-bit message M is encoded
by Alice into an n-bit codeword X, but what Bob and Eve observe across two different channels
are denoted by Y and Z, respectively. M̂ is the decoder output at the receiver end. Alice does
encoding such that not only can Y be decoded into M with arbitrarily small error probability, but
also Z should not reveal any valuable information about M beyond what is available a priori. The
first goal known as reliability requirement can be formulated as limk→∞ P r[M 6= M̂ ] = 0, and
the second objective known as the security requirement can be formulated by I(M ; Z)/n → 0
as n → ∞, meaning that for a large number of channel uses the average mutual information rate
between Eve’s knowledge and the secure message has to be negligible. Wyner showed that we can
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FIGURE 1.1. Wiretap channel

achieve both objectives by forward coding without any need for secret key sharing when these two
channels satisfy the required conditions.
We should note that both reliability and security constraints are information theoretic rather than
computational with the assumption that adversary is computationally unbounded. In other words,
unlike cryptographic approaches that rely on computational hardness of the attack for adversary,
Wyner’s information theoretic secrecy does not depend on any assumptions on the wiretapper’s
resources and capabilities of any kind. Namely, physical layer secrecy provides a stronger notion
of secrecy than complexity based cryptographic approaches. The results of Wyner’s work have
been extended to many contexts, most notably Gaussian channels [23] and broadcast channels
with confidential messages [9].
The largest k/n for which both objectives of reliability and security are achievable in communication is called secrecy capacity which is a function of both main and wiretapper’s channels. In
[1] Wyner showed that if the wiretapper’s channel is a concatenation of the main channel and another DMC, meaning that it is a degraded version of the main channel, the secrecy capacity will be
positive. Csiszar et.al in [9] proved that when the main channel is less noisy than the wiretapper’s
channel, the secrecy capacity is positive. In other words, they showed that when the capacity of the
main channel is higher than that of the wiretapper’s, we would intuitively expect a positive secrecy
capacity. When two channels are arbitrary, computation of secrecy capacity in general is an open
problem. Suppose that X has distribution of PX (x). Let I(X; Y ) and I(X; Z) denote the mutual
information between Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve, respectively. It is proven in [24] by Van Dijk that if
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I(X; Y ) and I(X; Z) are individually maximized by the same input distribution of PX (x), and the
main channel (X → Y ) is less noisy than the wire-tap channel (X → Z), The secrecy capacity
for the wire-tap channel will be
Cs = Capacity(X → Y ) − Capacity(X → Z).

(1.9)

In Wyner-type encoder redundancy will be added to correct errors that occur across the main
channel, and randomness is added for keeping Eve ignorant across the wiretap channel. If an encoder with information transmission rate of Rs = k/n satisfies the reliability and security requirements for a given wiretap channel with secrecy capacity of Cs , such that Rs = Cs , then it is said
that such an encoder achieves the secrecy capacity. Most of the work in the context of wiretap
channel encoding rely on non-constructive random-coding framework with an argument that when
the secrecy capacity is positive there exist codes that achieve secrecy capacity.
It should be pointed out that a general wiretap channel encoding is based on coset-coding or
syndrom-coding that goes back to the works by Wyner, [1, 25]. This approach is further generalized and extended in [26, 27]. Coset-coding technique utilizes two binary linear codes: an inner
code and an outer code. The inner code is a subset of outer code, assuming that the difference in
their dimension is k, the outer code can be divided into 2k cosets of the inner code. Each message
corresponds to a linearly chosen coset, but what is transmitted by Alice is a uniform randomly
selected codeword in that coset. Indeed, the outer code provides error correction across the main
channel and therefore guarantees reliability, but the inner code based on which the choice of the
codeword is randomized ensures secrecy. As a result, the problem is to construct inner and outer
codes that satisfy both reliability and secrecy constraints and achieve the secrecy capacity. However, it is still a challenge to design an outer code that can be decoded across the main channel.
So far, the constructive solution for the wiretap channel problem is only available in some special cases. For instance, when the wiretap channel is binary erasure channel (BEC) and the main
channel is noiseless, a special class of LDPC codes are proposed in [28, 29], that are proven to
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achieve secrecy capacity. Recently, in [30], Mahdavifar et.al. used polar codes to construct coding
schemes that can achieve secrecy capacity for a wider range of channel models that are symmetric
with binary inputs.

1.4

Basics on Symmetric Encryption and Cryptanalysis

End-to-end cryptography is the most common technique used to ensure security in communication
systems [31]. In all of these algorithms, the transmitter Alice tries to transmit a message to the
receiver Bob, but meanwhile eavesdropper, called Eve, tries to obtain any knowledge about the
message. The cryptographic algorithm with an encryption key determines a number of mathematical operations applied over the original message called plaintext, to generate a ciphertext (also
called cryptogram). Since Bob is aware of the utilized key, he will be able to decipher and obtain
the plaintext. Although it is often assumed that Eve knows the algorithm, decryption of the ciphertext to obtain the original message without knowing the key is computationally infeasible for
her. Basically, there are two concepts of symmetric and asymmetric encryption in cryptography
field. In this Section we give an introduction about symmetric key encryption, and asymmetric
cryptography will be briefly discussed in Section 1.5.

1.4.1 Symmetric Encryption
A class of cryptography algorithms that use the same key to encipher the plaintext and decipher the
ciphertext are called symmetric key encryption. This secret key, denoted by k, used for enciphering
is indeed shared between Alice and Bob to keep a private information link. Alice enciphers the
plaintext m using the encryption algorithm denoted by E and generates the ciphertext c where
c = E(k, m), and then sends c to Bob. Bob deciphers the received c using the shared key k to
recover the plaintext m = D(k, c). It is assumed that encryption and decryption functions E and
D are publicly known [32]. The encryption algorithm is designed in the sense that without knowing
the key k, it is computationally infeasible to apply the decryption function D over c and obtain the
message. Symmetric encryption algorithms have the fastest hardware and software implementation
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among all encryption techniques. It makes them well suited for encryption of a large amount of
data. However, their main disadvantage is that they require a secure channel to exchange and
share secret keys. This can be resolved by using public key encryption, that belongs to asymmetric
encryption class and are less efficient, or other existing secret key agreement algorithms that will
be discussed in Section 1.5. That is the main reason why symmetric and asymmetric encryptions
together provide a complete cryptosystem [32].
Symmetric encryption algorithms are divided into two major categories: stream ciphers and
block ciphers. Unlike block ciphers that use a deterministic function to encrypt fixed length of
plaintext, stream ciphers operate the encryption over a stream of plaintext, and processes it character by character while the encryption transformation and the length of the strings to be encrypted
vary by time. In hardware implementation, they are faster than block ciphers and have less complexity [33]. Moreover, in situations that transmission noise is highly likely, stream ciphers are
more appropriate since they cause much less or no error propagation compared to block ciphers.
Due to these advantages stream ciphers are widely used in today’s cipher systems. Some important stream ciphers include Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSRs) based stream ciphers, SEAL
(Software-optimized Encryption Algorithms) and RC4. Since in our work in [15] we used a specific block cipher for encryption and analysis, we dedicate a separate Section for block ciphers.

1.4.2 Block Ciphers and Cipher Feedback Mode of Operation
A block cipher is a symmetric key encryption algorithm with M = C = {0, 1}n , where M is the
message space, C is the ciphertext space and with key space K = {0, 1}r :
E : {0, 1}r × {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}n ,

(k, m) 7−→ E(k, m).

(1.10)

The encryption algorithm E encrypts the plaintext block with a fixed length of n-bit by using the
secret key k, to generate ciphertext blocks c with the same length of n, where n is called the block
length, and r is called the key length [32].
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The modern block ciphers are designed based on the notion of iterated product cipher. In his
seminal work [22], Shannon suggested to use product ciphers in which simple operations like substitutions and permutations are combined as a tool to effectively enhance security of the message.
In product ciphers, encryption is carried out in multiple rounds, where there exists an original key
out of which different sub-keys for each round are derived. The structure of Data Encryption standard (DES) as the most well-known symmetric block cipher, is based on iterated product cipher
in which each round involves a Feistel scheme [34]. This Feistel function includes expansion, key
mixing, substitution and permutation. DES and some recent realizations of block ciphers like Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) belong to the class of substitution-permutation (SP) networks.
SP network is a product cipher which consists of multiple stages each involving substitutions and
permutations [33].
In DES cipher the substitution process in Feistel scheme is performed by 8 substitution boxes (Sboxes) that apply a non-linear transformation to their input bits based on a look-up table. S-boxes
are the only non-linear mapping in DES that provide the core security for this cipher without which
it would be easily breakable. S-boxes in block ciphers like DES and AES are designed in a way
that the required “Confusion and Diffusion" introduced by Shannon in 1940’s [22] is satisfied. It
requires that when one bit of the key or the input to the cipher is altered, decryption output will
have a burst of errors. This property is called avalanche effect [35].
DES was published by the U.S. National Bureau of Standards (now National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST) in 1977 as the first commercial-grade modern cryptographic algorithm. It has block length of 64-bit and key length of 64-bit where only 56-bit of these are actually
used by the cipher as key bits. Due to the short key length that DES has, it is now considered to be
insecure. In January 1999 it was publicly broken in a collaborative work done by distributed.net and
Deep Crack within 22 hours and 15 minutes. Furthermore, because of some analytical weaknesses
that it has, it was withdrawn by NIST as a standard and now is superseded by AES [34]. Although
DES is replaced by AES, it is still being used and studied in some applications [36, 37] mostly in
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the form of Triple DES with three independent keys (168-bit key and 112-bit security) which is
believed to be secure in practice. Moreover, many general attacks against block ciphers like differential and linear cryptanalysis were developed based on the studies on DES cipher making it
the most studied and analyzed cipher. That is why we chose to use DES to investigate whether our
proposed secrecy system in [15] can remain sufficiently secure when it is used to enhance secrecy
of DES cipher which has well-known secrecy weaknesses.
After a 5 year competition, AES was selected to replace DES as a Federal standard and then
was adopted by NIST. It was submitted by two Belgian cryptographers, Joan Daemen and Vincent
Rijmen with the name of Rijndael, Daemen. AES algorithm [38, 39] is a symmetric block cipher
that can encrypt blocks of size 128-bits, by using cipher keys with different lengths of 128, 192
and 256-bits. This cipher operates on a 4 × 4 column major order matrix bytes, called the state.
By a block cipher, one can encrypt a single block of data with cipher’s block length. Using block
ciphers with modes of operation allows us to utilize them in a secure and repeated way. Modes of
operation are designed to derive a key stream from block ciphers like DES or AES. To encrypt a
variable length message, it must be divided into separate cipher blocks, such that the last block
must be extended to have the same length as the cipher block length by using a padding scheme.
Each of these blocks will be processed within the chain structure of the operating mode which
applies randomization by using an initialization vector (IV) as an additional input [33]. The five
most common modes of operation for block ciphers are Electronic Codebook (ECB), Cipher-Block
Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), Output Feedback (OFB) and Counter Mode (CTR) [40].
In Chapter 2 we use CFB mode with block cipher of DES to analyze performance of a cipher
in our scheme. CFB mode is one of the operational modes that can be used to transform a block
cipher like DES into a stream cipher which is widely used in many applications [41, 42]. We
consider a simple case when the plaintext is partitioned into blocks with the size of cipher’s block.
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FIGURE 1.2. Cipher Feedback mode

Its structure is illustrated in Fig. 1.2. The operation in CFB can be divided into three steps:
intialization:

I1 = IV.

Encryption:

Ii = ci−1 ,

Decryption:

p′i = Ek (Ii ) ⊕ ci ,

ci = Ek (Ii ) ⊕ pi ,
(1.11)

Where p′i is the stored plaintext or decryption output at time i. In this structure the ciphertext at
time i is used as input to the cipher at time i + 1, implying that the currently generated ciphertext
depends on both the current input and the previous ciphertext and consequently the preceding
plaintexts. When the block cipher is operated in CFB mode, it acts like a self synchronizing stream
cipher, meaning that when a block or a number of blocks are lost, after the same number of blocks
it can resynchronize itself and avoid further errors in decryption. Another property of CFB is
that encryption function E is used both for encipherment and decipherment [33]. CFB causes
error propagation when a received ciphertext is noisy, that will be later discussed and analyzed in
Chapter 2.

1.4.3 Known Plaintext Attack and Linear Cryptanalysis
When the attacker has both samples of the plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts, the attack
model for cryptanalysis is called the known-plaintext attack (KPA). Linear cryptanalysis is a KPA
which was first proposed by Matsui in [43] to attack DES. It is one of the most widely used attacks
on block ciphers. This cryptanalysis approach exploits a linear equation with the probability of
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p 6=

1
2

which involves some input and output bits of the DES cipher and is used to obtain some key

bits [43]. The quantity ε = |p − 21 |, which is called bias, measures the correlation among plaintext,
ciphertext and the key bits, and can be used as a criterion to distinguish the right key. Before attack,
Eve has to gather a large number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs by querying an oracle, and then for
each possible key value count the number of pairs that satisfy the linear equation. Since the bias
obtained by the right key will be considerably larger than the bias of a random key, attacker takes
the key value that maximizes the bias as the right key.
If we refer to m as the number of attacked key bits in linear cryptanalysis, the number of subkey
candidates would be 2m that has to be sorted from rank 1 to 2m based on their corresponding
probability bias. It should be noted that it is not necessarily always true that the right key ranks the
highest, but it will be surely among high ranked candidates. Assume that adversary only checks
top 2m−a candidates during exhaustive search, and since each subkey candidate gets checked with
all possible combinations of 56 − m remaining unattacked bits, Eve has to run exhaustive search
with at most 256−m encryptions for each candidate. As a result, the total number of 56 key bits
examined in linear attack with bit advantage a is 256−a . In [44], A. Selçuk showed that when the
number of attacked key bits m and the total number of gathered plaintext-ciphertext pairs N are
large enough, the probability of success Ps , defined as the probability that the right key is among
256−a top candidates, can be derived as
√
Ps = Φ(2 N ε − Φ−1 (1 − 2−a−1 )),

(1.12)

where a is the bit advantage of the attack, ε is the bias of the used linear approximation and Φ is
R∞
defined as Φ(x) = √12π x exp(−u2 /2)du.

1.5

Secret Key Agreement

The main difficulty in symmetric encryption is that it requires identical keys to be transmitted and
shared between Alice, as a transmitter, and Bob, as a receiver, in a secure way before communication. in order to solve this problem Whitefiled Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976 proposed
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the principles of asymmetric encryption in [45] which is also called public-key encryption. In this
work they invented a key exchange protocol and revolutionized cryptography techniques. The first
real cryptographic algorithm for public key encryption was designed by L. Rivest, K. Shamir, and
L. Adleman at MIT, and was named RSA as the initial letters of its three inventors [46].
In public-key-encryption, the same key is not used for encryption and decryption, and therefore
there is no need to share the same key between them. It works in this way that initially each user
generates a pair of keys, one as a public encryption-key which is widely distributed and every
user is aware of it, and one as a private-decryption-key that is known only to the recipient. The
transmitter and every user can encrypt the message using the public key of the recipient while
only the intended recipient can decrypt the ciphertext with his private key. These keys are mathematically related but are designed such that finding the private key from the known public key is
computationally infeasible.
Since most of the public-key-encryption algorithms require randomly generating large prime
numbers, which is computationally inefficient and slow, they are mainly used to communicate secret keys, and then Alice and Bob can use the shared keys in their fast computable symmetric
encryption algorithms for secure communication. However, the existing computational as well as
power constraints in some applications like wireless devices make public-key-encryption unfavorable for them. As a result, there is a need to present low complexity schemes that can handle key
management problem. We try to deal with the problem in Chapter 3.

1.5.1 Physical Layer Based Secret key Sharing
The idea that physical channel characteristics can be utilized to enhance secrecy goes back to
Wyner’s work in [1] that was discussed in Section 1.3. However, Wyner’s degraded wiretap channel was described to be unrealistic by Maurrer in his seminal work [2]. In this paper he presented an
information theoretic based key agreement scheme with a two-way channel model that is publicly
observable in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. His strategy is based on correlated random17

ness and public discussion. Its key elements are outcomes of the information reconciliation and
privacy amplification procedures.
In reconciliation step both terminals come up with a randomly generated body of data that is
identical between them through exploiting public discussion channel. This common random sequence that is agreed by two parties will be used to extract secret keys by privacy amplification.
Although the correlated randomness may be partially known by Eve, privacy amplification reduces
it into a shorter length sequence, that has a uniformly random distribution given Eve’s information
implying that she can gain almost no knowledge about it. Advantage of this scheme over Wyner’s
is that in certain cases it works even if Eve has a less noisy channel. Due to importance of privacy
amplification we dedicate the whole Section 1.6 to discuss about it.
Maurrer defined secret key rate as the maximal achievable rate at which secret key can be generated by legitimate partners about which an eavesdropper has virtually no knowledge. In other
words, secret key rate is the maximal rate at which Alice and Bob, by communicating over an authentic but insecure public channel, can generate secret keys in a way that Eve obtains knowledge
about the shared key at an arbitrarily small rate [2].
Since Maurrer’s scheme does not involve any complex computations of prime number generation, as does public-key-encryption, it offers a more efficient solution to secret key sharing problems. In a related work by Ahlswede and Csizar [47], the problem of secret-key sharing based
on the generated common randomness is studied, and the concept of key capacity is defined. In
[48], Csiszar and Narayan derived secret key capacity when a helper supplies additional correlated
information for Alice and Bob. They characterized single-letter key-based capacities when there
exist arbitrary number of terminals in [49]. The problem of physical layer secret key sharing studied in [2] was extended by Maurrer and Wolf in [13] to active adversary scenario when adversary,
in addition to just eavesdropping, can actively interact with legitimate parties or even tamper with
legitimate communications. In this work, they showed that secret key can be agreed at the same
rate as the passive eavesdropper scenario or such a secret key sharing protocol is infeasible.
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The next evolution in physical-layer-based secret key sharing was exploitation of inherent common randomness in wireless communication channels. One of the first examples of such techniques was proposed by Koorapaty et.al [14], in which based on the independence of channels
of Alice/Bob and Alice/Eve, the secret key was extracted from the phase of fading coefficients.
Since then there have been numerous techniques that utilized the randomness inherent in wireless
channels for key generation [50], [51], [52]. There are also some other techniques like [53], [54]
that utilized the well known ARQ protocol to facilitate exchange of secret keys between Alice and
Bob. Our proposed scheme in [16], to be discussed in Chapter 3, is another application of ARQ
mechanism to establish secret keys.

1.6

Privacy Amplification

Privacy amplification is a technique to distill highly secret shared information, from a large body
of common information which is only partially secure. Suppose that legitimate users share a string
X = Y = S, about which, however adversary has possibly some information. Privacy amplification is the art of transforming this partially secret string into a virtually secret key Ŝ about which
Eve can only obtain arbitrary little information.
First described in the context of quantum key agreement, privacy amplification was generalized
by Bennett et.al in [55] to probabilistic information about S. They showed that when from Eve’s
perspective the length of Ŝ is approximately equal to the Rényi entropy of S, we can make sure
that she can only attain a negligible knowledge about Ŝ. This privacy amplification technique is
based on universal hashing. Another technique that is currently used for privacy amplification is
based on random extractors [56], [57].

1.6.1 Universal Class of Hash Functions
Among all techniques for privacy amplification, universal hashing is a well-known approach against
deterministic eavesdropping [55]. A class of hash functions that maps an n-bit binary string into
a r-bit string is universal if the collision probability for two distinct inputs is 2−r [55]. Universal
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hashing has this property that by uniform-randomly choosing a function from a universal class of
hash functions, regardless of what distribution the actual input has, for sufficiently short output,
the expected hash output will have a distribution close to uniform which results in the maximum
entropy.
Let X be a random variable with distribution of PX . The collision probability Pc (X) is the
probability that X takes the same value in two independent experiments:
Pc (X) =

X

PX (x)2

(1.13)

x∈χ

The Rènyi entropy of order 2 of X is also called collision entropy since it can be written as the
negative logarithm of the collision probability:
H2 (X) = − log2 Pc (X)

(1.14)

The conditional collision entropy on a random variable Y , H2 (X|Y ) can be computed by
H2 (X|Y ) =

X

PY (y)H2 (X|Y = y)

(1.15)

y

The following bound provided by Bennett et.al in [55] (as Corollary 4), describes how Eve’s collision entropy about a created randomness W conditioned on her observed data v limits her knowledge regarding output of universal hashing function applied over W :
Lemma 1. Let PV W denote an arbitrary probability distribution where v is a realization of random
variable V observed by Eve. Let G be uniform randomly chosen function from a universal class of
hash functions from W to {0, 1}r , when Alice and Bob choose K = G(W ) as their secure key, If
Eve’s collision entropy H2 (W |V = v) about W is lower-bounded by c, we will have
H(K|G, V = v) ≥ r − log2 (1 + 2r−c ) ≥ r −

2r−c
ln 2

Thus, when r < c, Eve’s uncertainty about the secret key K is close to maximum value r as the
entropy of the uniform distribution, and her information about this key K will be arbitrarily small.
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For our analysis in Chapter 3 we use the following lemma, proven in [55] as Corollary 4 which is
derived from Lemma 1:
Lemma 2. Let W denote a random n − bit string with uniform distribution over {0, 1}n , for an
arbitrary eavesdropping function e : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}t , and let V = e(W ). let s < n − t be a
positive safety parameter, for some t < n, and let r = n−t−s. If Alice and Bob select K = G(W )
as their secret key where G is chosen randomly from a universal class of hash functions from
{0, 1}n to {0, 1}r , then Eve’s expected knowledge about the secret key given G and V , satisfies
I(K, GV ) ≤ 2−s / ln 2.
Roughly speaking universal hashing extracts the minimum collision entropy of the weakly random source W into the secret string K, in the sense that the knowledge of Eve about K would be
upper-bounded by 2−s / ln 2 where s is the security parameter.
Hayashi in [58] showed that when input has sufficient entropy in terms of Rényi entropy of
order 1 + α, for α > 0, after application of universal hash function, Eve’s information about the
generated random variable decreases at an exponential rate that can be lower-bounded. The bound
provided by Hayashi is more generalized and in some cases even tighter than the bound obtained
by Bennett in [55]. It is the basis of our analysis in Chapter 4.

1.6.2 Randomness Extractors
Although universal classes are more economic compared to other functions, one limitation that
these functions have is that they require a description as long as the string that forms their input.
Extractors, as another technique for privacy amplification, allow us to more efficiently extract the
randomness of some weakly random source into entirely random data, by using a small additional
number of perfectly random bits called catalyst or seed, in a sense that these bits reappear as a part
of the almost uniformly generated output [56]. Due to their efficiency, extractors have attracted
lots of attention and intensely studies in recent years [57], [59], [60]. A formal definition of a
randomness extractor according to [56] is as follows:
21

Definition 1. A function Ext : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}d −→ {0, 1}r is called a (δ, ε) extractor if for
any random variable X with range X ⊆ {0, 1}N , and min-entropy H∞ (X) ≥ δN , the variational
distance of the distribution of [S, Ext(X, S)] to the uniform distribution over {0, 1}d+r is at most
ε when S is independent of X and uniformly distributed in {0, 1}d .
As stated in their definition, extractors distill virtually all the min-entropy out of a weaklyrandom source X , thereby requiring only a small number of truly-random bits S from the set
{0, 1}d . This definition not only requires that the length of the extractor output is approximately
equal to the min-entropy of the source plus the number of random bits, but that these bits even
reappear as a part of the output. The following theorem proven in [56] measures the entropy of the
adversary given her knowledge about the random bits S when an extractor is used for distilling
randomness.
Theorem 1. Let δ, ∆1 , ∆2 > 0 be constants. Then, there exists for all sufficiently large N , a
function Ext : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}d −→ {0, 1}r , where d ≤ ∆1 N and r ≥ (δ − ∆2 )N , such that for
all random variables X with X ⊆ {0, 1}N and H∞ (X) > δN we have
H(Ext(X, S)|S) ≥ r − 2−N

1/2−o(1)

(1.16)

As Eq. (1.16) implies, when min-entropy H∞ is at least a fraction of the length of the source
X, for sufficiently large N , the second term in upper bound of the entropy goes to zero, thereby
maximizing Eve’s uncertainty about the extracted output given her knowledge.
Most of the recent research on extractors has focused on the extraction of secure keys from
discrete noisy sources [59]. Fuzzy extractor is the basic primitive resulted from this work that
allows to extract a secure cryptographic key from a noisy source. It consists basically of two phases.
In the first phase that is called enrollment, by using probabilistic procedures a secure key and a
helper string will be extracted from an original random source. The helper string is truly random
and has to be considered as publicly available and hence attacker can observe it. The receiver
receives a noisy version of the original source whose distance from it is less than a determined
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threshold. In the second phase which is called reconstruction phase the receiver will recover the
original source from noisy data by using the helper and then extracts the secure key out of it.
In other words, the reconstruction phase takes input as the noisy received data and the helper to
reconstruct the original key.
Fuzzy extractor combines two functionalities, information reconciliation (also called error correction) and privacy amplification (ensuring that eavesdropper has negligible knowledge about the
key). It was noted in [59] that a fuzzy extractor can in general be built upon two primitives: a
secure sketch and a strong extractor. The secure sketch part makes it possible to exactly reconstruct the original source from the public helper string and the noisy received data. The strong
extractor extracts the secret key from the reconstructed source. In [60], Ishai et.al. introduces the
notion of correlation extractors as a generalization of randomness extraction and related the notion of privacy amplification to the case of two correlated sources. Correlation extractors extract
nearly perfect instances of a given joint distribution from imperfect, or leaky, instances of the same
distribution.
In Chapter 4, we introduce a new notion of Rényi entropy extractors that extracts randomness in
terms of Rényi entropy which is generalization of the current extractors that measure randomness
on the basis of min-entropy and statistical distance.

1.7

Secrecy Metrics

Consider a security function (like an encryption) E : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}c that is applied over input
M to generate the output E(M ). What Eve receives through her channel ChA : {0, 1}c → {0, 1}d
is Z = ChA(E(M ). The security that this function provides with respect to an adversary can
be measured using secrecy metrics. Secrecy metric xs denoted by Advxs (E, ChA) measures the
amount of information about message M that is present in Z. The smaller this number, the more
security E is able to deliver. Some examples of secrecy metrics are semantic security, distinguishing
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security, mutual information and adversary success rate or decryptment error probability. In this
chapter we discuss the last three that are relevant to the accomplished works in this dissertation.

1.7.1 Mutual Information Security
The secrecy condition that Wyner used in [1] was that limn→∞ I(M ; ChA(E(M )))/m = 0 where n
can be considered as the number of channel uses or a parameter that both m and c are functions of it.
Wyner assumes that message M is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}m . It was criticized by Maurer
in [61] who proposed a stronger notion of secrecy condition which is limn→∞ I(M ; ChA(E(M ))) =
0 with the remaining assumption of having a message with uniform distribution. This secrecy condition put forth by Maurer is equivalent to saying that H(M |Z) also called equivocation moves
to H(M ) for large n. Namely, knowing Z does not reduce Eve’s uncertainty about the message.
Since then mutual information between Alice and Eve’s variables has been adopted as a measure
of information leakage and secrecy criterion in many works by information theory community
[1, 9, 47].
Bellare et.al. in [3] named this secrecy metric that was adopted by Wyner and Maurer as mutual
information for random messages (Mis-r). He denoted it by Advmis−r (E, ChA) = I(M ; ChA(E(M )))
for it is defined for uniformly random message M . However, from cryptography point of view this
metric is weak since we know that real messages are not uniformly distributed. They maybe English text, votes, scores of an exam that are not necessarily uniform messages. Namely, Mis-r can
not ensure security for these types of data that have rise in applications of cryptography. In cryptography community the independence from message distribution has been viewed important for a
good definition. Although it is argued in information theory community that message can be compressed before encryption, we should note that lossless compression is a deterministic operation
that does not change entropy. Moreover, no universally source independent compression exists for
finitely long messages [62].
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In [3, 4], Bellare suggests using a stronger notion of secrecy called mutual informations security
(MIS) defined as
Advmis (E; ChA) = max I(M ; ChA(E(M ))),
M

(1.17)

with maximization over all distributions of M over {0, 1}m . When Advmis is negligible, it ensures
that the required security will be achieved regardless of how messages are distributed. It provides
the required message distribution independence for security. In Chapter 4 we use mutual information between Eve’s information and the message source as the secrecy criterion and require it to be
negligible for any given distribution of the input. Thus, our defined secrecy metric can also capture
distributions that arise in cryptographic applications.

1.7.2 Eve’s distinguishability
Although MIS is a strong secrecy metric, its underlying intuition is somewhat obscure for cryptographers. They have very different approaches and intuition. Bellare in [3, 4] defines two other
metrics that more conform with cryptographic approaches that are Semantic Security (SS) and
Distinguishing Security (DS). Here we discuss DS.
Advantage of Eve’s distinguishability or distinguishing security (DS) is defined as
Advds (E; ChA) = max 2P r[A(M0 , M1 , ChA(E(Mb ))) = b] − 1
A,M0 ,M1

= max SD(ChA(E(M0 )); ChA(E(M1 ))),
M0 ,M1

(1.18)

where b is a random variable uniformly distributed on {0, 1} and SD denotes the statistical distance which is half of the L1 distance. The maximization is over all messages M0 , M1 as strings in
{0, 1}m and all adversaries A. P r[A(M0 , M1 , ChA(E(Mb ))) = b] is the probability that adversary
A, given m-bit messages M0 , M1 , and the ciphertext resulted from Mb , is able to correctly identify
the random challenge bit b. The advantage is defined as how success probability of adversary in
distinguishing bit b differs from a priori success probability of 21 . As Eq. (1.18) indicates this advantage is equivalent to statistical distance between random variables ChA(E(M0 )) and ChA(E(M1 )).
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Distinguishability security based on statistical distance was also adopted by Canetti in [7] as
a universally composable secrecy metric. In seeking for a general methodology for expressing
security requirements in any protocol environment, they proposed using variational distance or
Eve’s distinguishability to evaluate information leakage based on half of L1 norm distance. Hayashi
in [63] presents secrecy exponent analysis based on this metric. Variational distance is a metric
that given Eve’s knowledge measures statistical distance of the secret message from a uniformly
generated random message over the same alphabet set. This metric will be analyzed in Chapter 4
where we compare it with the metric based on mutual information. Our analysis shows that mutual
information is a slightly stronger metric compared to variational distance. However, variational
distance is more compatible with cryptographic approaches and can be used to evaluate secrecy of
any cryptographic protocol that brings about its main advantage which is universal composability.

1.7.3 Attack Success Rate or Eve’s Error Probability
Cryptanalysis success probability has been used as a widespread secrecy criterion in cryptography
community [43, 44, 64, 65]. In traditional and more strict definition of success rate it refers to the
probability that the right candidate is found as the first key among sorted ones in the first phase
of cryptanalysis [64, 65]. Selçuk in [44] proposed a new definition for success in attack in the
sense that the correct key is found not necessarily as the highest-ranking candidate but among a
set of high-ranking ones. In this analysis he provided formulas for direct calculation of the success
probability of linear and differential cryptanalysis. We discussed his approach of analysis for linear
attack in more details in Section 1.4.
If we consider a more general model for cipher where its type and the approach for cryptanalysis are not specified, success rate of the attack can be interpreted as the probability of correct
decryptment [66, 67] or attack error probability [68]. Works in [66–68] consider Additive-Like
Instantaneous Block (ALIB) cipher that has an additive-like function as a combiner of the message
input and the key stream. In fact, they view cipher as a communication system encoder, whose code
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rate is the rate of key stream generation from a cipher key, and the cryptanalyst as the communication decoder. They try to choose a key rate and a cipher to make it improbable for the attacker
to deduce any significant portion of the message. In other words, their objective is to design a bad
code acting like a good cipher that results in a high probability of error for the decoder which is
adversary [68].
Consider a sequence of n message blocks denoted by M1 , M2 , . . . , Mn . Let cryptanalyst estimation of this sequence be M1∗ , M2∗ , . . . , Mn∗ . Average probability of correct decryptment for this
sequence of n messages is defined as [67]
n

1X
pb =
P r[Mi∗ = Mi ].
n i=1

(1.19)

Similarly error probability of cryptanalysis will be 1 − pb . The designer attempts to make pb and
the key rate as small as possible. However, this secrecy criterion is relatively weak compared to
other metrics like Eve’s distinguishability or mutual information. First of all, since it quantifies
error probability averaged over a large number of events, even for a very low success probability
there could occur some rare events when Eve successfully decrypts the message and obtains the
required information. Moreover, based on Fanos’ lemma [18], a function of error probability provides an upper-bound for equivocation (Eve’s uncertainty about the message given her knowledge)
implying that high equivocation ensures a high error probability but not the other way around.
Namely, mutual information and equivocation are much stronger secrecy metrics compared to
average cryptanalysis error probability. Nevertheless, error probability gives a more intuitive understanding of performance of a cipher system. For instance, in Chapter 4 we adopt Eve’s error
probability of estimation of the plaintext as the secrecy criterion for the cipher that guarantees a
primitive secrecy as the baseline to achieve a higher level of secrecy.
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Chapter 2
Enhancement of Secrecy of Block Ciphered Systems
by Deliberate Noise
In this chapter based on our work in [15], we consider the problem of end-to-end security enhancement by resorting to deliberate noise injected in ciphertexts. The main goal is to generate a
degraded wiretap channel in application layer over which Wyner-type secrecy encoding is invoked
to deliver additional secure information. More specifically, we study secrecy enhancement of DES
block cipher working in cipher feedback model (CFB) when adjustable noise is introduced into encrypted data in application layer. A verification strategy in exhaustive search step of linear attack is
designed to allow Eve to mount a successful attack in the noisy environment. Thus, a controllable
wiretap channel is created over multiple frames by taking advantage of errors in Eve’s cryptanalysis, whose secrecy capacity is found for the case of known channel states at receivers. As a result,
additional secure information can be delivered by performing Wyner type secrecy encoding over
super-frames ahead of encryption. These secrecy bits could be taken as symmetric keys for upcoming frames. Numerical results indicate that a sufficiently large secrecy rate can be achieved by
selective noise addition.

2.1

Introduction

Traditionally, end-to-end secrecy delivery relies on symmetric or asymmetric encryption residing
in the upper layer of a communication system, as well as sophisticated key management schemes
[31, 69]. Without requiring a secure cipher, Wyner-type secrecy encoding provides a completely
different solution to link-wise secret message delivery by random binning tailored to some presumed wiretap channel models in physical layer [1, 9]. In this chapter, we propose an encodingencryption approach to end-to-end secrecy delivery by encoding over a degraded wiretap channel
across super-frames transmitted in the application layer. The resulting wiretap channel is created
by injecting controllable noise into ciphertext after encryption, and determined by both the adver28

sary node’s uncertainty about the key of cipher and its limited resources in launching cryptanalysis.
Secrete information transmitted in such manner could be taken as keys for the subsequent superframe.
In the proposed framework, we are essentially exploring the techniques developed for physical
layer secrecy encoding and cryptanalysis against symmetric block ciphers to serve our purpose of
realizing end-to-end secrecy enhancement without resorting to exogenous physical channel conditions. More specifically, Data Encryption Standard (DES) block cipher working in Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) is taken to encrypt messages encoded using the Wyner type secrecy encoding
scheme and then transmitted over multiple frames encrypted using different keys. Random binary
noise is then deliberately added onto ciphertext, which are received by both legitimate user and
an eavesdropper without any additional distortion. Such a hierarchical encoding-encryption framework allows us to transmit secrete messages over the resulting degraded wiretap channels in the
application layer without making any assumption regarding end-to-end physical channel conditions.
In order to analyze secrecy enhancement achieved by utilizing our encoding-then-encryption
approach, we need to study how Eve responds to the existing noise in her gathered data, and how
that influences her cryptanalysis performance. In our case, Eve attempts to mount her linear attack
with accumulated noisy ciphertexts, and thus applies a new verification strategy in the second phase
of the linear attack while considering her possible resource constraints. Our statistical analysis
shows that even when she uses a numerically optimized attacking strategy to obtain the key, it is
likely for her to make mistakes in cryptanalysis. These possible failures of Eve over multiple frames
make her channel degraded than the main channel, which can be further exploited by secrecy
encoder to send additional secret bits over a super-frame. Therefore we could utilize generated
secret bits over the last super-frame, whose secrecy is ensured by Wyner-type secrecy encoding
scheme, to establish keys for next coming frames. The secrecy capacity of the system is computed
assuming known channel states at Bob and Eve. Numerical results illustrate how deliberately added
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noise influences secrecy rate which can be further maximized at certain noise rate. It should be
noted that the primary goal of our work is to demonstrate through such a case-study how secrecy
encoding and symmetric encryption could be put together to enhance end-to-end security, and thus
we only provide capacity computation of the resulting channel towards the end without dealing
with the implementation of a particular secrecy encoder [28].
In literature, very few analytical approaches have focused on the impact of noisy ciphertexts on
the attacking performance. In [70] different security schemes are analyzed from both reliability
and secrecy perspectives in the presence of channel noise; nonetheless, they do not discuss what
modified strategy Eve needs to take adaptively against degradation, and nor have they considered
further leveraging adversary’s failures in its cryptanalysis. In fact, our approach shares a common
spirit with friendly jamming schemes proposed in physical layer secrecy encoding [71, 72] where
deliberate noise is introduced in physical layer to interfere both legitimate link and eavesdropped
link to improve the secrecy rate region. Unlike these works where link-wise physical channel features are explored to create a degraded wiretap channel, we essentially explore the adversary’s
disadvantages due to its uncertainty about the secrete key bits and resulting deteriorated success
rate in cryptanalysis in the presence of deliberate noise.
In addition, deliberate additive noise in encryption process was used to improve security of ciphers in previous works [73–75]. The primary goals in these works were to enhance the secrecy
of a cipher by random binning and additive noise, but we are interested in deploying encodingthen-encryption framework to enhance secrecy by further encoding over a resulting degraded
wiretap channel. Random measurement noise has also been considered in side channel attacks
(SCA) where information about cryptographic operation is leaked through some physical measurements conducted by an adversary [76]. In [77], authors proposed to use multi-linear approximation
utilized in Differential Power Analysis (DPA)-like attacks, which is powerful due its robustness
against noise.
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The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2 the proposed security scheme is described,
and in 2.3, we design an optimized verification strategy for Eve. In section 2.4 the main and wiretap channels are modeled, and then the resulting secrecy capacity is computed in section 2.5. The
numerical results are presented in section 2.6, and finally we conclude this chapter in section 2.7.

2.2

The proposed scheme for security system

Fig. 2.1 illustrates the proposed scheme for secrecy improvement in which after encryption of the
original message S, intentional noise is injected into it to generate a degraded wiretap channel.
Since we consider end-to-end secrecy, physical channel is assumed to be error-free. Therefore,
the ciphertexts that Bob obtains only include errors caused by intentional noise introduced into
encrypted data in application layer with bit error rate of η. Moreover, because Alice and Bob agree
on the key used for the current data frame, Bob can decrypt the obtained noisy ciphertexts and
then apply the wiretap channel decoding algorithm that allows him to recover the original message
Ŝ with arbitrarily small error probability. As indicated in Fig. 2.1, there exists an oracle, whereby
Eve can query and obtain consecutive plaintext/ciphertext pairs. However, due to the deliberate
noise, it provides Eve with noisy ciphertexts distorted with independent errors of rate η. As the
main advantage over Eve, Alice and Bob share the same encryption and decryption key which is
unknown to Eve. Therefore, she has to adopt an attack strategy that can exploit the gathered noisy
data in order to guess the secret key.
We assume that legitimate users initialize with a shared set of keys in a highly secure manner
at the beginning. As a result, Alice can divide the whole data into equal size data frames, each
including M number of data blocks of size 64-bit which is the block size used in CFB mode. In
this way, the same key will be used for M 64-bit blocks in each frame for encryption and decryption
at the receiver end. In this chapter, we show that due to Eve’s resource constraints, it is likely for
her to make mistakes in assessing a frame key. As a result, Eve’s channel is a degraded version
of the main channel. We can leverage this advantage by applying Wyner secrecy encoding over
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FIGURE 2.1. The proposed security scheme based on the intentional noise

super-frames to average over all possible failures by Eve. In Wyner-type encoder redundancy is
added to correct errors that occur across the main channel, and randomness is added for keeping
Eve ignorant across the wiretap channel [1], [28].
Another issue is key scheduling problem to provide highly confidential and distinctive keys for
each frame while Bob is fully aware of them. The traditional methods of key management like
master/session key scheduling approaches [31, 69] are sophisticated and costly. Here, we propose
a simpler technique that derives the required secrecy for frame keys from secret bits delivered by
Wyner secrecy encoder over the created wiretap channel. As a result, since encoder is performed
over each super-frame, Alice can use input to the encoder to extract frame keys in next superframe, for instance by applying a universal class of Hash functions over it [55]. Bob is able to
decode encrypted data and obtain the encoded message, and thus he will be able to derive keys for
next frames.

2.3

Eve’s attack strategy and its analysis

This section studies the effect of the channel degradation on the performance of the linear cryptanalysis in terms of Eve’s success rate. Since linear cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack, Eve
has to rely on the received plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Due to the existing errors in these ciphertexts, when Eve examines a key, she is unable to distinguish between errors caused by the received
noisy ciphertext and the ones induced by using the wrong key. Thus, she needs to design a new
verification approach that gives her the maximum possible success rate in finding the right key.
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2.3.1 Designed Verification Strategy for Attack
Consider ciphertexts go through a binary symmetric channel whose cross-over probability is η.
Let Cn be the ciphertext block at time n. After it passes through channel and Xors with channel
noise, the received noisy 64-bit ciphertext Ĉn will have error with the probability of 1 − (1 − η)64 .
Therefore, Eve can not rely only on two successive ciphertexts to check the correctness of a key,
because they might have errors that can lead her to make mistakes. Indeed, Eve has to try a number
of successive pairs, using CFB mode in order to increase her success rate.
In Fig. 2.2, two consecutive stages of CFB that are used to check the key are shown, where Pi
and Ĉi are respectively the plaintext and ciphertext for the ith stage, Si is the encrypted result of
Ĉi−1 that after Xor with Pi generates Ĉih . Provided that the used key is correct, Ĉih must be the
same as Ĉi , but due to the possible errors in Ĉi or Ĉi−1 there might be some differences between
them. Hence, Hamming Weight (HW) of Xor of Ĉih and Ĉi denoted by Ei must be compared with
a threshold denoted as τ . Then, a key trial for the ith stage can be considered successful if this HW
is less than τ .
Note that at stage i when there is an error either in the input to the cipher, i.e. Ĉi−1 or in the key,
there will be burst of errors in Si , which makes Ĉih totally different and in special case of α = 0.5
independent from Ĉi . Therefore, by choosing a small value for threshold τ and comparing HW of
Ĉih ⊕ Ĉi , Eve can know that either input to the cipher or the key is noisy. In Table 2.1, the key
verification strategy for Eve is given that she needs to follow in the brute-force attack phase of
linear cryptanalysis to test the correctness of the examined key ki . In this strategy, Eve examines
each key candidate Nc times with Nc consecutive pairs where Nc is chosen such that with a high
probability at least in one trial out of Nc tests, input to the cipher has no error. Then, Eve can
recognize the correct key when at least one of trials is successful.
Since when the examined key is correct and Ĉi−1 is error-free, all the discrepancies between Ĉih
and Ĉi will be caused by the possible errors in Ĉi , we can determine the minimum value for τ
such that the probability that the number of bit errors in Ĉi exceeds τ denoted by Pf ault becomes
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TABLE 2.1. Verification strategy

1- Pick Nc number of consecutive pairs.
2- Try Nc chosen pairs over Nc chained CFB stages using the key ki .
3- A trial is successful if HW (Ei = Ĉi ⊕ Ĉih ) ≤ τ .
4- If there exists at least one successful event out of Nc trials,
ki is the correct key, otherwise it is wrong.

FIGURE 2.2. key verification process for Eve with two consecutive CFB stages

negligible.
Pfault = 1 −

τ  
X
64
i=0

i

(η)i (1 − η)64−i .

(2.1)

In the next step, we need to find the optimum value for Nc . Let K0h be the hypothesis when the
examined key is wrong and K1h when it is right. Then, let Ai be a random variable where Ai = 1
defines successful trial at the ith stage that happens when HW of Ei is less or equal to τ , and Ai = 0
otherwise. By proper selection of τ , we can make sure that whenever there is no error in the input
to the cipher, Eve can recognize the right key. Thus, probability of success event is
P1 = P r[Ai = 1|K1h ] = P [Ĉi−1 is error-free] = (1 − η)64 .

(2.2)

Eve misses the right key when all Nc trials fail that has the probability of
Pm = (1 − P1 )Nc ,

(2.3)

We call Pm key missing probability. Thus, we need to find minimum Nc such that keeps Pm below
a threshold like Tm .
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Now we need to compute the probability that Eve mistakenly admits a wrong key while examining a single candidate. When the used key is wrong due to the avalanche effect, Ĉih will have bit
error rate of α, that after Xor with Ĉi with bit error probability of η, results in output bit error rate
of γ as
γ = α(1 − η) + η(1 − α).

(2.4)

Since to admit a wrong key at the ith stage as the right one, HW of Ei must be less than τ , the
probability of a successful trial at this stage for a wrong key is
P2 = P r[Ai =

1|K0h ]

=

τ  
X
64
i=0

i

γ i (1 − γ)64−i .

(2.5)

On the other hand, Eve accepts a wrong key when there happens at least one successful trial for
it. Thus, the false key probability for a single candidate is
PF = 1 − (1 − P2 )Nc ,

(2.6)

Even though this probability seems negligible, it gets aggregated over a large number of examined
wrong key candidates, and can result in a non-negligible false key probability, as will be seen in
simulations.

2.3.2 Analysis of the Designed Attack Strategy for Eve
In [70] Yin et. al. showed that in noisy environment with bit error rate of η, for linear attack on
DES cipher, the probability bias of the new linear equation denoted by ε̂, as well as the success
probability of attacker Ps can be computed based on the linear probability bias of the original linear
equation ε and the number of obtained pairs by Eve N as
√
Ps = Φ(2 N ε̂ − Φ−1 (1 − 2−a−1 )),

where

ε̂ = 2u+v (1 − η − 0.5)u+v ε.

(2.7)

If adversary uses the improved linear analysis technique, she needs to use Matsui’s linear equation
for DES that requires u bits of plaintext and v bits of corresponding ciphertext where u + v = 26
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to guess m = 26 key bits [64]. As discussed in section 1.4, in linear attack with bit advantage of
a, the total number of examined keys is 256−a . If the ciphertexts that Eve obtains are error-free,
her success probability will be Ps which is the probability that the correct key is among top 256−a
examined candidates. For the case that obtained ciphertexts are erroneous, the following theorem
proven in Appendix 6.1 quantifies the probability that Eve obtains the correct key, fails to get any
key and obligatorily drops the whole frame or gets a wrong key.
Theorem 2. Consider a linear attack with bit advantage of a. Assume Eve’s obtained ciphertexts
contain bit errors with the rate of η, and that she uses the designed strategy in brute-force step of
the linear attack. Then, Eve’s total success probability can be computed by
Pc =

Ps (1 − Pm )
56−a
[1 − (1 − PF )2
] ≈ Ps (1 − Pm ),
56−a
PF 2

(2.8)

where Pm , PF and Ps are given in Eq.’s (2.3), (2.6) and (2.7). On the other hand, frame erasure
probability will be
56−a

Pe = (1 − Ps )(1 − PF )2

56−a −1)

+ Ps Pm (1 − PF )(2

≈ [1 − 256−a PF ][1 − (1 − Pm )Ps ].

(2.9)

In addition, the probability that Eve accepts a wrong key denoted by Pw can be derived as Pw =
1 − Pc − Pe .
Conclusively, we showed that there is possibility that Eve is not able to obtain any key, or to
falsely accepts a wrong key.

2.3.3 Restriction on Eve’s Resources
In our secrecy analysis we consider Eve to be restricted in resources with a limited computational
capability. In fact, the basis of analysis is that without any restriction, an unbounded adversary
would be eventually able to obtain the correct key by examining all possible keys with as many as
possible trials. However, when there is a limit on the number of evaluations that Eve can perform
36

or on the number of pairs that she can obtain, she has to restrict the number of key evaluations that
consequently impacts her success rate. We assume that adversary is bounded and can not perform
more than θ DES evaluations that limits her computational capability.
We also put restriction on the total number of pairs that Eve can use in her cryptanalysis. Let
us first consider the scenario where Eve has to gather all these N required number of pairs in
her attack from the transmitted data frame throughout which the same key is used for encryption.
Now, the question is that for a typical communication link what size this frame needs to have, and
how long it takes for Eve in order to accumulate these many pairs? For special case study let us
assume that Eve requires N = 246 number of pairs to mount her attack in noisy environment with
acceptable success rate. We should note that since according to Eq. (2.7), bias probability for noisy
case with η > 0 denoted by ε̂ is less than the bias for error-free case indicated by ε, to have the
same success probability in noisy environment as in the error-free case a higher number of pairs
would be required.
First of all, we consider known plaintext attack. Since communication overhead is publicly
known, Eve seeks to gather her required number of pairs from these transmitted overhead as plaintext blocks whose corresponding ciphertexts are received. For special case study we consider Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) which is a widely deployed protocol that routes most of the traffic
in Internet [78]. Considering TCP data transmission, for every payload of 1500 bytes, there will be
20 bytes added IPv4 header and 20 bytes TCP header, i.e. header rate is approximately hr = 2.6%.
In other words, in known plaintext attack 2.6% of the transmitted packets can be used by attacker
to gather her required plaintext/ciphertext pairs. If we consider the plaintext and ciphertext size
as the block size in CFB mode with DES cipher which is l = 64 bit, there have to be in total
L = N l/hr = 1.73 × 1017 number of transmitted bits to allow Eve gather N = 246 pairs. For data
speed of 100 Mbps, the total amount of time that is required to receive L number of bits by Eve
is T = 481153.8 hours that amounts to 20048 days assuming that all transmitted data is encrypted
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using the same key. We can see that for known plaintext attack Eve requires a tremendous amount
of time to gather her required pairs from a continuously transmitted frame.
For known ciphertext attack Eve only requires to gather all received ciphertexts that are encrypted blocks from the same data frame. Assuming that she requires N = 246 number of 64-bit
ciphertext blocks, for data rate of 100 Mbps the total required time would be 12510 hours equivalent to 521 days. It implies that for both known plaintext and ciphertext attacks, for Eve to gather
the required number of pairs in her attack from the transmitted data frame, a huge amount of time
is required which is unrealistic. That is why we consider the worst case scenario and assume that
there exists a virtual oracle providing Eve with the required number of pairs prior to her attack. In
our analysis the maximum number of noisy pairs that Eve is allowed to accumulate is denoted by
Nmax .

2.3.4 Parameter Optimization of Adversary’s Attack Strategy
Eave’s objective is to mount a successful attack, and in order to achieve this goal, she maximizes
the success probability of the utilized linear attack denoted by Pc , given in (2.8), knowing that her
computational ability is restricted to θ DES encryptions, and there is a constraint on the number of
plaintext/ciphertext pairs that she can accumulate. In linear cryptanalysis with modified exhaustive
search phase for noisy environment, Eve runs at most Nc 256−a DES encryptions, which due to her
computational constraints, can not exceed θ. Moreover, we assume that prior to mounting attack
on a frame of data, a virtual oracle provides Eve with as many number of pairs as her data storage
capability allows denoted by Nmax . As a result, she needs to design attack parameters including Nc ,
τ and a, to maximize the overall success probability subject to these constraints
max Pc

Nc ,τ,a

subject to θ ≥ Nc .256−a ,

N ≤ Nmax .

(2.10)

From Eq. (2.8) we can see that to maximize Pc we need to minimize Pm and PF . Since according
to Eq. (2.3), Pm mainly depends on Nc , we can define threshold Tm and find the minimum Nc for
which Pm remains below Tm . According to Eq.’s (2.5) and (2.6), to decrease PF we need to reduce
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TABLE 2.2. Parameter optimization algorithm for attack strategy:

1- Initialization: put τ = 1, Nc = 1.
Determine Tm and Tf as thresholds for Pm and Pfault
also Ncmax as the maximum value for Nc .
2- τ ← τ + 1 until Pfault > Tf and τ < 64
if Pfault ≤ Tf or τ = 64 go to the next step
3- Nc ← Nc + 1 until Pm > Tm and Nc < Ncmax
if Pm ≤ Tm or Nc = Ncmax go to the next step
4- Compute a0 = ⌈56 − log2 ( Nθc )⌉
5- Compute Pc for a0 ≤ a ≤ 56
choose a for which Pc has its largest value.
6- Output τ , Nc and a as attack parameters.
τ as much as possible. If we define a threshold Tf for Pf ault , we can find the smallest τ for which
Pf ault remains below Tf . Also, Eve has to choose an optimized value for a to have Pc maximized.
The algorithm in Table 2.2, is designed to optimize the linear attack parameters to let Eve achieve
the maximum success rate Pc , for a given η. In this algorithm, Pfault and Pm can be computed using
Eq.’s (2.1), (2.3), respectively.

2.4

Main and Wire-tap Channel modeling

In this section, we model main and wiretap channels in block level (with 64-bit input and 64-bit
output), using a stationary finite state Markov chain (MC). Since Eve might achieve the right frame
key, get a wrong one or even get nothing and drop the whole frame, we also need to model her
channel in frame level as a three state memoryless channel.

2.4.1 Main Channel Modeling Using MC
As it was described, the encrypted data goes through a BSC channel with cross over probability of
η, created by intentionally introduced noise in application layer. We next model the CFB cipher,
channel with deliberate noise and decipher altogether as a single channel, in order to analyze the
effect of intentional noise at the output of decipher. Note that we assume there is no degradation in
actual physical channel.
Fig. 2.3 illustrates the encryption and decryption structure of CFB mode with DES cipher in
the presence of introduced noise to ciphertexts. As shown in this figure, {Ci } and {Ĉi } are the
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FIGURE 2.3. CFB enciphering and deciphering with channel error

sequences of transmitted 64-bit ciphertext and received noisy ciphertext blocks, respectively, and
{P̂i } is the sequence of decrypted blocks at time i for i = 1, 2, . . .. In addition, {Zi } is the sequence of 64-bit blocks of intentional bit errors in channel Zij that are independent and identically
distributed with Bernoulli distribution as P r[Zij = 1] = η for j = 1, . . . , 64, such that Ĉi = Ci ⊕Zi .
As Fig. 2.3 indicates when Ĉi is noisy, it introduces errors with the rate of η to the decryption output at time i, i.e. P̂i . Moreover, since Ĉi−1 gets encrypted with DES at time i, due to the avalanche
effect, it induces bit error rate of α in P̂i . As a result, to characterize the channel error state in
decryption output at time i, it is required to consider errors in both currently received ciphertext Ĉi
and the previous one Ĉi−1 . Hence, we need to define four states.
Note that in a particular case when we consider α = 0.5, when Ĉi−1 has error, due to the fact that
half of the ciphertext will be in error, errors in P̂i will be independent from Ĉi and consequently
from the error state at time i + 1. However, when it has no error, errors in Ĉi will affect both decryption outputs at times i and i + 1, and therefore the current state will depend on the previous
one. As a result, we have to take all four states into account, each with a different transition prob40

ability from the input plaintext block Pi denoted as 64-bit vector X to the output stored plaintext
P̂i denoted by 64-bit vector Y , and let E = X ⊕ Y denote the transition error vector.
The channel states are defined as: state S0 , in which there is no error from vector X to the vector
Y and happens when there is no error in Ĉi and Ĉi−1 . State S1 , which happens when there is at
least one bit error in Ĉi , but no error in DES cipher input, Ĉi−1 . State S2 , which shows the situation
in which there is at least one bit error in Ĉi−1 without any error in Ĉi . In this channel state, due to
the avalanche effect, each bit at the output of DES cipher, flips independently with the probability
of α causing bit error probability of α in Y . State S3 , in which both Ĉi and Ĉi−1 have at least one
bit error.
For state S0 we have P r[ej = 1|S0 ] = 0 and for S2 , P r[ej = 1|S2 ] = α, where ej denotes the j th
bit of E for j = 1, . . . , 64. On the other hand, we should note that in states S1 and S3 , output bits
can not be treated independently because S1 and S3 are based on a given condition on the whole
64-bit ciphertext Ĉi . Let q denote the probability that there exists at least one bit error in Zi as

q = 1 − (1 − η)64 .

(2.11)

The next lemma gives the input-output transition probability for states S1 and S3 , which is proven
in Appendix 6.2.

Lemma 3. Let X be the input plaintext and Y be the stored plaintext in CFB mode. Assume that the
generated ciphertexts go through a channel with error rate of η. We denote the HW of the resulted
error vector E with W (E). Then, for state S1 the input-output vector transition probability will be

P r(Y |X, S1 ) =





η W (E) (1−η)64−W (E)
q


 0

W (E) 6= 0
W (E) = 0
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(2.12)

FIGURE 2.4. Alice-Bob channel model as a four state MC

where α is the avalanche bit error rate, and γ is given in Eq. (2.4). The transition probability in
state S3 for all W (E) is
P r(Y |X, S3 ) =

(2.13)

γ W (E) (1 − γ)64−W (E) − αW (E) (1 − α)64−W (E) (1 − q)
.
q

Next, we need to find state transition probabilities. For instance, when the state at time i − 1 was
S2 , apparently Ĉi−1 has been error free, so the only condition required to have state S0 happen at
time i is to receive error free Ĉi which has the probability of 1 − q that is the transition probability
from state S2 to S0 . Similarly, we can compute other state transition probabilities. Notably, since
probability of occurrence of the current state only depends on the previous one, Bob’s channel
can be modeled as a four state MC that is depicted in Fig. 2.4 with the following state transition
probability matrix:


1 − q


 0
T =

1 − q


0

q

0



0


0 1 − q q
,

q
0
0


0 1−q q

whose elements demonstrate the transition probabilities between different states. Note that in each
state, input plaintexts undergo different channel conditions and error probabilities. In fact, the main
channel can only be modeled as a BSC channel in states S0 and S2 with cross over probabilities of
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FIGURE 2.5. Eve’s hierarchical channel model

0 and α respectively, whereas in other two states it can be modeled based on input-output transition
probabilities in (2.12) and (2.13).
In particular, since in MC model for Alice-Bob channel, all four states can be reached from one
another, it is an irreducible MC with positive recurrent states [79]. Then, with a supposedly large
frame size, MC can reach its stable condition. Since all states are positive recurrent, the set of
equations Pt T = Pt , and Pt .1 = 1 have a unique solution as Pt = [p0 , . . . , p3 ] where pk denotes
the steady state probability of state Sk for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} [79]. Where 1 is a 4 × 1 vector with all
elements to be one, and P is steady state probability vector (SSPV). By solving this equation set,
we get
t





P = (1 − q)2 q(1 − q) q(1 − q) q 2 .

(2.14)

2.4.2 Wire-tap Channel Modeling
When Eve obtains the right key of a frame with the probability of Pc by using optimized verification
strategy in linear attack, her decrypted data in that frame undergoes the same channel condition
as Bob’s. As shown in Fig. 2.5, we refer to this channel state for Eve as the correct key state in
frame level which occurs with the probability of Pc and can be modeled as a MC with four channel
states in block level. Nevertheless, with the probability of Pe , Eve will not be able to get any key
for the attacked frame and has to drop the whole frame. We refer to this state as erasure state.
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Moreover, Eve gets a wrong key with the probability of Pw , such that after using a wrong key due
to the avalanche effect in DES cipher, each bit in DES output will be independently flipped with
the probability of α. This induced error Xors with intentional i.i.d. channel noise that has bit error
probability of η. Consequently, in wrong key state, Eve’s channel can be modeled as a BSC with
cross over probability of γ given in (2.4). Conclusively, wiretap channel is a degraded version of
the main channel that only in the correct key state can it be as good as Bob’s channel. In fact,
Eve’s channel behaves like a pseudo two-dimensional Markov Chain (P2DMC) [80] with three
memoryless states in frame dimension, each acting like another MC in block dimension as shown
in Fig. 2.5.

2.5

Secrecy capacity computation

The next step is to quantify the secrecy capacity of the analyzed security system. The capacity of
finite state Markov chains was calculated in [81] and [82]. In [83] and [84] the capacity of the
finite state Markov chains with binary symmetric channels associated in each state, was studied. In
[85] secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel modeled as a finite state MC is computed. To compute
capacities, we assume that the channel states are perfectly known to Bob and Eve in block level,
so what we compute is mutual information between the input X and output Y given the current
channel state, i.e. I(X; Y |Sl ). In frame level, it is assumed that Eve knows the correctness state
of each used frame key towards the end of each frame. Specially, this can be considered as the
best scenario for Eve, providing us a lower bound for secrecy rate. The main purpose of secrecy
capacity computation is to design a secrecy encoder which is applied ahead of the encryption in
application layer over multiple frames. Namely, when the message is transmitted at a rate below the
secrecy rate to Bob using a Wyner-type encoding technique [25], [28], we can have an arbitrarily
small error probability for Bob as well as the maximum entropy for Eve. In the asymptotic sense,
by secrecy encoding, users utilize Eve’s failures which cause her channel to be a degraded channel
compared to Bob’s.
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2.5.1 Capacity of the Main Channel
When channel state information is available, the capacity is the average of capacities that each one
of these MC states contribute to the overall channel capacity [81], [83]:
C=

K−1
X

pk C(Sk ),

(2.15)

k=0

where C(Sk ) is the channel capacity in state Sk in bit per channel use. It can be computed as the
maximum information rate between input and output vectors, X and Y , respectively, assuming that
the current state Sk is known to Bob:
C(Sk ) = max I(X; Y |Sk )/64.
PX

(2.16)

Note that our modeled four state Markov channel is uniformly symmetric because in any state,
channel is output symmetric [81]. For instance, in states S0 and S2 , the channel behaves as a BSC
channel. In states S1 and S3 , if we define the transition probability matrix as Pij = P r(Y =
j|X = i, Sl ) for i ∈ Y, i ∈ X , l = 1, 3, its rows and columns are permutations of each other
because according to equations (2.12) and (2.13), its elements only depend on the HW difference
of input-output vectors. As a result, also in states S1 and S3 , the channel is output symmetric. In
[81] it is shown that for uniformly symmetric channel in which noise is independent of inputs, like
our modeled Markov channel, capacity can be achieved with distribution which is uniform and
iid. Accordingly, in this finite state Markov channel by uniformly distributed inputs, the mutual
information will be essentially maximized.
In state S0 , channel is error-free with capacity of 1, i.e. C(S1 ) = 1, and in state S2 , it acts like
a BSC with cross over probability of α and the capacity of C(S2 ) = 1 − h(α), where h is binary
entropy function. However, for S1 and S3 in which decryption bit errors are not independent, we
need to compute the mutual information between input and output vectors, namely I(X; Y |Sl ) for
l = 1, 3, that is
I(X; Y |Sl ) = H(Y |Sl ) − H(Y |X, Sl ).
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(2.17)

We assume that channel state is perfectly known to Bob. In the following theorem which is proven
(in Appendix 6.3) using Lemma 3, we compute H(Y |X, Sl ) for l = 1, 3.
Lemma 4. Consider our four state MC model for the main channel with input vector X and output
vector Y . With equally likely input plaintexts, we can compute H(Y |X, S1 ) as
 k

64  
−1 X 64 k
η (1 − η)64−k
64−k
H(Y |X, S1 ) =
η (1 − η)
. log
.
q k=1 k
q

(2.18)

and H(Y |X, S3 ) will be
64  

−1 X 64  k
. γ (1 − γ)64−k − αk (1 − α)64−k (1 − q)
H(Y |X, S3 ) =
q k=0 k

 k
γ (1 − γ)64−k − αk (1 − α)64−k (1 − q)
.
. log
q

(2.19)

On the other hand, for both states S1 and S3 , every output vector Yj can be generated by introducing all possible error vectors over their corresponding input vectors. Hence, since all 64-bit
input plaintexts are uniformly distributed, the output will also be equally likely, so for l = 1, 3 the
output entropy is H(Y |Sl ) = 64. Thus, by using Eq. (2.17) we can compute the mutual information
for states S1 and S3 as
I(X; Y |Sl ) = 64 − H(Y |X, Sl ),

for

l = 1, 3,

(2.20)

where H(Y |S1 , X) is given in Eq. (2.18), and H(Y |S3 , X) in Eq. (2.19). According to Eq. (2.16)
the channel capacity in states Sl for l = 1, 3 will be
C(Sl ) =

I(X; Y |Sl )
64

(bits per channel use),

(2.21)

with I(X; Y |S1 ) and I(X; Y |S3 ) given in Eq. (2.20). We can analyze Alice-Bob channel as a finite
state MC with steady state probabilities given in Eq. (2.14). Hence, according to Eq. (2.15) Bob’s
channel capacity CB as the average of the state capacities can be computed as
CB = (1 − q)2 + q(1 − q)[C(S1 ) + 1 − h(α)] + q 2 C(S3 ).
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(2.22)

where α is the average bit error rate caused by the avalanche effect. In addition, C(S1 ) and C(S3 )
are given in Eq. (2.21), implying that these capacities mainly depend on q, γ, α and η . As a
result, the main channel capacity depends on q and γ which according to Eq.’s (2.11) and (2.4) are
themselves functions of η, for a fixed α. Therefore, Bob’s channel capacity mainly depends on the
original channel cross over probability η.

2.5.2 Secrecy Capacity of the Wire-tap Channel with Noise
When Eve with the probability of Pc obtains the right key, her channel capacity will be the same as
Bob’s, i.e. CB , but when with the probability of Pw gets a wrong key, her channel will turn into a
BSC with the cross over probability of γ, which has the capacity of 1 − h(γ). Note that, the erasure
state does not contribute to the capacity. Hence, Eve’s capacity will be
CE = Pw (1 − h(γ)) + Pc CB ,

(2.23)

where CB is given in Eq. (2.22). As discussed in Section 1.3, when the main channel is less noisy
than the wiretap channel and the mutual information between Alice at Bob are individually maximized by the the same input distribution, the secrecy capacity can be computed as the difference
of two capacities. In our channel model, the first condition holds and only uniformly distributed
input maximizes both mutual informations, therefore the secrecy capacity will be Cs = CB − CE
as:
Cs = CB (1 − Pc ) − (1 − Pe − Pc )(1 − h(γ)).

(2.24)

This result implies that secrecy capacity mainly depends on Pc , Pe and CB . Due to the fact
that all Pc , Pe and CB highly depend on the channel error rate η, the main parameter that impacts
secrecy capacity of the system is intentional noise. Namely, if Alice can control the cross over
probability of the channel, it is possible to adjust secrecy rate of the system. Note that Alice applies
secrecy encoding over multiple frames in order to statistically average over Eve’s possible failures
in frame level, and also to enable Bob to do the error correction coding when burst of errors
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occurs. Basically, Alice and Bob has to use a well designed wiretap channel encoder, based on
the computed secrecy rate in Eq. (2.24). Notably, the main issue in this scheme is delay that is
imposed on the system by applying multiple frame encoding that makes this scheme applicable
only for delay tolerant communication.

2.6

Numerical Results

The main objective of numerical analysis is to evaluate the effect of varying η on secrecy rate in
order to see if there exists an optimum value for η for which secrecy capacity reaches its maximum.
In simulations, we assume that Alice by controlling η is able to generate a degraded wiretap channel. In addition, we assume that the whole data is divided into equal size frames, each containing
as many number of 64-bit data blocks as four-state MC reaches its steady state, such that for each
frame, encryption and decryption key remains constant.
Let us assume that θ = 248 is the maximum number of DES encryptions that Eve can perform
to establish an attack on each frame. Because for instance, with a CPU having speed of 2.6 GHz,
it takes for about 30 hours for her to accomplish these many encryptions. For attack optimization
algorithm proposed in section 2.3.4, the initial values selected for n is n0 = 20, maximum possible
value for Nc is chosen Ncmax = 100, and the thresholds Tf and Tm are set to 10−5 . Furthermore,
we chose α as avalanche effect bit error rate to be 0.5. To evaluate the effect of noise variation
on the performance of the system, we changed η from 10−4 to 0.05 with 500 steps of size 10−4 .
Moreover, suppose that Eve is able to detect these step size changes on η by probing the channel
and each time is able to optimize all attack parameters using the parameter optimization algorithm.
We assume that Eve is not allowed to use more than Nmax = 246 number of pairs in her attack.
In Fig. 2.6, overall success probability, wrong key and frame erasure probabilities are depicted
as functions of η for fixed number of pairs equal to 246 . As this Figure displays with rising η,
Pc is monotonically decreasing, reaching zero for η > 0.017, while wrong key probability Pw
goes to 1 for η = 0.05 because of increase in PF . As discussed in section 2.3.1, the obtained
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FIGURE 2.6. Overall success probability, frame erasure and wrong key probabilities versus channel cross
over probability

results for Pw show that it becomes considerable for some channel conditions and can not be
ignored. Moreover, the staircases in these curves occur in η’s for which algorithm optimizes and
changes attack parameters. In Fig. 2.7 curves of main and wiretap channel capacities as well as the
secrecy capacity are drawn as functions of η. This Figure shows that Alice-Bob channel capacity
is monotonically decreasing with increase in η while secrecy capacity Cs rises up to its maximum
value 0.3442 for η = 0.0125 and then falls. Indeed, this cross over probability can be considered
optimum value for which secrecy capacity achieves its maximum.
TABLE 2.3. Optimized attack parameters using proposed algorithm in subsection 2.3.4

η
Nc
τ
a
Pc

0.001
5
3
23
0.9999

0.005
9
5
24
0.9636

0.01
16
6
24
0.5014

0.0125
20
7
27
0.1618

In Table 2.3 optimized attack parameters using our proposed algorithm for four different η’s, i.e.
0.001, 0.005, 0.01 and 0.0125 are given. According to this table, with increase in η, the required
number of trials Nc for each key increases from 5 to 20 in order to keep Pm below the threshold
Tm = 10−5 when it rises. The same holds for parameters a and τ which to achieve the determined
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FIGURE 2.7. Main channel and Eve’s channel capacities and secrecy capacity for varying channel cross
over probability

thresholds, have to increase with rising channel noise to maximize the overall success probability.
According to our numerical results, Alice can adjust channel conditions by introducing deliberate
noise in application layer to have η = 0.0125, to achieve the desirable secrecy capacity.

2.7

Conclusion

In this chapter we showed that by introducing tunable noise in application layer upon the encrypted
data, even though Eve utilizes an optimized attack strategy, the secrecy rate of the system can
remarkably increase. In fact, Alice can achieve a sufficiently large secrecy capacity by adjusting
the cross over probability of the channel using deliberate noise. This secrecy rate guarantees a
highly secure and reliable communication using wiretap channel coding in application layer over
multiple frames. For secrecy capacity computation we tailored the known channel states scenario.
In our future work, we will focus on the unknown state case and also will consider a more generic
cipher.
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Chapter 3
ARQ Based Symmetric-Key Generation over
Correlated Erasure Channels
In this chapter based on our work in [16], we focus on the problem of sharing secret keys using
Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) protocol. We consider cases where forward and feedback channels are erasure channels for a legitimate receiver (Bob) and an eavesdropper (Eve). In prior works,
wiretap channel is modeled as statistically independent packet erasure channels for Bob and Eve.
In this chapter, we go beyond the state-of-the-art by addressing correlated erasure events across
the wiretap channel. The created randomness is shared between two legitimate parties through
ARQ transmissions that will be mapped into a destination set using the first order digital filter with
feedback. Then, we characterize Eve’s information loss about this shared destination set, due to
inevitable transmission errors. This set will be transformed into a highly secure key using privacy
amplification in order to intensify and exploit Eve’s lack of knowledge. We adopt two criteria for
analysis and design of the system: outage probability as a measure of secrecy, and secret key rate
as a metric for efficiency. The resulting secrecy improvement is presented as a function of the
correlation coefficients and the erasure probabilities for both channels. It is shown that secrecy
improvement is achievable even when Eve has a better channel than legitimate receivers, and her
channel conditions are unknown to legitimate users.

3.1

Introduction

The broadcast nature of wireless transmissions makes it more vulnerable from security perspective. Traditionally, security can be provided using cryptographic approaches, mainly relying on
generation, sharing and renewing of secret keys [33]. However, key management is deemed quite
challenging in wireless networks. Maurer et.al. in [56] considered information theoretic key agreement in noisy communication channel based on common randomness and public discussion. They
have defined secret key rate as the maximal achievable rate at which secret key can be generated by
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legitimate partners (Alice as transmitter and Bob as receiver) about which an eavesdropper (Eve)
has virtually no knowledge.
Among physical layer based key management techniques, some have utilized the well known
ARQ protocol to facilitate exchange of secret keys between Alice and Bob [53], [54]. In [12]
authors have proposed using ARQ mechanism to generate secrets by taking advantage of Eve’s
inevitable information loss due to transmission errors. In this approach, dynamic secrets are extracted from created common randomness using universal class of hash functions [55]. However,
in all of these works feedback channel is assumed to be error-free which is not satisfied in mobile radio environment. In this work, we consider a key management scheme similar to [12], and
characterize a two-way communication channel model where feedback channel is assumed to be a
Binary Erasure Channel (BEC). Previously, in ARQ communications, feedback transmission was
also modeled as erasure channels [86],[87].
In all of these schemes, it is assumed that erasure events for Bob and Eve are statistically independent. However, in real radio communications, there could be correlation between channels from
a transmitter to different receivers depending on the availability of line-of-sight, physical deployment of the receiver antennas and the presence or absence of scatterers [88]. In [89] information
loss in terms of reduction in secrecy capacity due to the correlation in wiretap channel is quantified.
In [90] the effects of correlation between packet erasures at Bob and Eve on the performance of
LDPC based secrecy coding scheme was addressed.
Our work lies in a different category than the works in [1], [9], [89] that rely on secrecy capacity
measure nor do we design specific codes for correlated wiretap channel as [90]. This work is
based on Maurer’s work [56] where key distilling problem from common randomness is studied.
In cryptography community this problem is addressed based on extracting strong security form a
weakly secure source that is common between two parties [5]. The main goal in this area is to
increase generation rate of a sufficiently secure key.
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In this work a key scheduling algorithm based on ARQ transmission mechanism used in [12] is
revisited, analyzed more thoroughly, and further modified to address more challenging technical
issues such as synchronization and correlation. The key contributions can be summarized below:
• One of the main issues in ARQ mechanism used to generate shared randomness is synchronization. We show that even with erasure feedback channel, synchronization between Alice
and Bob in selection of a random body of transmitted data, called One-Time-Frame (OTF)
set, can be guaranteed using the proposed reconciliation protocol.
• For performance analysis we design an optimized attack strategy based on binary hypothesis
testing [91] allowing Eve to estimate this common randomness.
• We design a digital filter based mapping and apply it over OTF set to generate a destination
set constituting shared random data between legitimate users. By using this mapping strategy
Alice and Bob can take advantage of possible mistakes in Eve’s decisions due to transmission
errors in order to cause further information loss for her. This lack of knowledge, will next be
manipulated by applying privacy amplification to establish secure keys.
• In our correlated wiretap channel model we consider correlation between erasures in main
and eavesdropper’s channel and then analytically and quantitatively study its negative influence on both secrecy and efficiency of the designed scheme. We study the trade-off between
secrecy measured in terms of secrecy outage rate and efficiency in terms of secret key rate
and design system parameters to achieve the required secrecy and efficiency.
In simulations, evaluation of the achieved secrecy shows that almost for all channel conditions
the required security enhancement can be attained, even when erasures are correlated and Eve
has a better channel than that between legitimate users. Simulations also demonstrate that even in
unknown wiretap channel condition a good secrecy is achievable.
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FIGURE 3.1. Erasure forward and backward channel model for wiretap channel

This chapter is organized as follows. Correlated wiretap channel model is illustrated in section
3.2, and reconciliation strategy is explained in section 3.3. The proposed attack strategy for Eve and
its analysis is presented in section 3.4 followed by description of the mapping strategy in section
3.5. In Section 3.6 we analyze the performance of the designed system in terms of secrecy and
efficiency. Numerical and simulation results are illustrated in section 3.7. We conclude this chapter
in 3.8. Proofs are provided in Appendix.

3.2

Correlated Channel Model

We consider the wiretap channel with memoryless packet erasure channel (PEC) model, where
erasures for Bob and Eve are correlated. In our model, ARQ is added for authenticated users as
shown in Fig. 3.1. We use frame structure where M number of packets, encrypted using the same
symmetric key and then encoded according to a specific encoding rule, will be encapsulated into a
frame. Alice transmits these packets over the main channel Qm to an intended recipient called Bob.
Across Qm packet erasures occur with probability δ. Bob is permitted to request retransmission of
any missing packets up to K times using a feedback channel Rm . When he decodes a packet
correctly sends back a bit 1 as an ACK, otherwise returns a bit 0 as a NACK. Alice receives these
feedback bits through Rm modeled as a BEC with bit erasure probability η.
Eve as a passive eavesdropper observes transmitted or retransmitted packets through a wiretap
channel Qw modeled as a PEC with packet erasure probability ε. She is supposedly aware of the
decoding rule and is also able to observe feedback messages through a backward wiretap channel
Rw where bit erasures occur with probability θ. Since Qm and Qw are memoryless, erasures occur
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independently within each channel. However, packet erasures between two channels are correlated
with correlation coefficient ρ. We define two Bernoulli random variables Em and Ew with values
in the set {0, 1}, where one indicates erasure and zero indicates correct reception of a packet at
one-time transmission. Hence, P r(Em = 1) = δ and P r(Ew = 1) = ε. Let pij = P r(Em =
2
i, Ew = j). Then, δ = p10 + p11 = E[Em ] = E[Em
] and ε = p01 + p11 = E[Ew ] = E[Ew2 ]. Pearson

correlation coefficient between random variables Em and Ew can be written as [92], [90]
Cov(Em , Ew )
p11 − δε
ρ= p
=p
.
V ar(Em )V ar(Ew )
δε(1 − δ)(1 − ε)

(3.1)

We should note that given a value for δ and ε, ρ can not take every value in the interval [0, 1] and
will be bounded by the functions of erasure probabilities. By considering that δ = p11 + p10 and
P
ε = p11 + p01 , and the fact that 1i,j=0 pij = 1 where pij > 0, we can get the following bounds for

ρ

max(δ + ε − 1, 0) − δε
min(δ, ε) − δε
p
.
≤ρ≤ p
δε(1 − δ)(1 − ε)
δε(1 − δ)(1 − ε)

(3.2)

If we define Bernoulli random variables em and ew for erasure events in feedback channels Rm and
Rw , respectively, we will have P r(em = 1) = η and P r(ew = 1) = θ. Let qij = P r(em = i, ew =
j). Then, across feedback channels these bit erasures are correlated with correlation coefficient of
Cov(em , ew )
q11 − ηθ
ψ=p
=p
.
V ar(em )V ar(ew )
ηθ(1 − η)(1 − θ)

(3.3)

Similar to ρ, there also exist bounds for ψ. Finally, we have

3.3

p
p11 = ρ δε(1 − δ)(1 − ε) + εδ,

q11 = ψ

Reconciliation Strategy

p
ηθ(1 − η)(1 − θ) + ηθ.

(3.4)

In this key management scheme only packets that are decoded correctly for the first transmission
and their corresponding feedbacks are received error-free by Alice would be selected to be in OTF
set. Once the number of packets in the collected OTF reaches the threshold nts , they will stop
putting packets into it. The main purpose of reconciliation step is to make sure that legitimate
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users have no disagreement upon this randomly selected body of transmitted data. The next step
is to apply a mapping strategy to generate a destination set that will be next used to extract secret
keys by applying a mutually agreed universal hashing function over it. Each packet format contains
three important fields: a retransmission flag that is set to 1 by Alice when a packet is retransmitted
to let Bob know that it does not belong to OTF, a unique sequence number assigned to each packet,
which is the sequence number of the previous packet in the frame incremented by one, and a
dropping flag used for synchronization purposes.
In this scheme, we use Stop and Wait protocol (SW), that requires Alice to wait for the response
from Bob, which is the feedback message represented by a bit belonging to the set {0, 1, e}. Whenever Alice receives ACK, represented by bit 1, she finds out that a new packet has to be transmitted,
but once she receives a NACK feedback, represented by bit 0, she realizes that the packet has to be
retransmitted, thereby suggesting that it is not in OTF. The erased bit e represents the case when
Alice has not received the feedback message at the required time interval. In this protocol, if the
current packet is received correctly at first transmission, and the next received packet is a new one
with a different sequence number, the receiver can identify that the current packet belongs to OTF.
Each packet can be retransmitted at most K times to make it more likely for Bob to correctly
decode it. If no ACK is received within K retransmissions, Alice drops the packet.
One of the main problems in this algorithm is OTF synchronization issue because there is possibility of discrepancy between Alice and Bob. For instance, assume that Bob has received a packet
correctly in the first transmission, yet ACK has not gone through the backward channel in any of
its retransmissions. Since Alice has not received any ACK, she will decide to drop the packet and
transmit a new one. Next, Bob receives a packet with a different sequence number, leading him to
put the previous packet into OTF. We include a dropping flag in each packet to avoid such problems
which is set to one for a packet when the number of consecutively dropped packets prior to it is
odd, and zero otherwise.
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TABLE 3.1. Denotations

i
ki
Pi
Fi
SRi
SDi

The ith correctly received packet by Bob
The Reception time for packet i
The assigned sequence number to packet i
The corresponding feedback of packet i
The retransmission flag sign associated with packet i
The dropping flag sign associated with packet i

Suppose that at the beginning of each frame, the timers in both sides launch and increments
by one by each packet transmission. Consider the denotations in Tab. 3.1. Let the next correctly
received packet i + 1 arriving at time ki+1 have the sequence number of Pi+1 = Pi + j and the
dropping flag sign of SDi+1 . Therefore, Bob realizes that there were j − 1 dropped packets within
the time interval [ki , ki+1 ]. Whenever j − 1 is odd and SDi+1 = 0, or j − 1 is even and SDi+1 = 1,
he finds out that packet i is dropped and does not belong OTF. The pseudo-codes for Alice and
Bob’s OTF packets selection strategies are presented in Tab.’s 3.2, 3.3. Alice puts a packet i into
OTF if at first transmission, the received feedback Fi = 1. On the other side, from SRi , Bob can
realize that it is not a retransmission, and also by observing Pi , Pi+1 and SDi+1 she finds out it is
not dropped and belongs to OTF.
TABLE 3.2. Alice’s OTF strategy

If packet i is transmitted more than once, set SRi = 1 and i 6∈OTF
Else set SRi = 0 and wait for feedback Fi
If Fi = 1 put packet i into OTF, Else i is not in OTF

TABLE 3.3. Bob’s OTF strategy

If packet i is received correctly, check SRi
If SRi = 1, i is not in OTF, Else check Pi+1
If Pi+1 = Pi + j for j 6= 0, then
If j is odd (even) and SDi+1 = 0(1), put i into OTF
Else, i is not in OTF
When Alice and Bob make decisions based on these strategies, it can be guaranteed that their
synchronization error on OTF set is zero, and both completely agree on nts OTF packets that later
on will be used as a basis to establish secret keys. As a result, packet that are received correctly
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with probability 1 − δ and their feedbacks are received correctly with probability 1 − ε, will be in
common OTF set with the probability of

Pc = (1 − δ)(1 − η).

3.4

(3.5)

Eve’s attack strategy and its performance

Even though Eve is able to eavesdrop retransmissions as well as feedback messages, unlike Alice
and Bob, she is not certain of synchronization with users. In fact, that is because her transmission
errors are partially independent from the errors in the main channel, and she is unable to directly
communicate with the transmitter, or for instance ask for retransmission as Bob does. As a result,
she has to determine a strategy to make decisions based on the eavesdropped data.
Let iE indicate a packet that Eve has received correctly with sequence number PiE , associated
feedback message FiE and retransmission flag SRiE . Let also iE + 1 denote Eve’s next correctly
received packet. Note that to decide which packets are in OTF, Eve has to make the best use of her
obtained information about these packets. There are some cases that help Eve confidently know
what exactly users did with the packet iE . For instance, when SRiE is one, or FiE is zero, she can
ascertain that packet iE does not belong to OTF.
In other cases where PiE +1 6= PiE , Eve has to make a guess about packet iE based on her main
observation which is the feedback message, FiE . In this scheme Eve uses binary hypothesis testing
based on Maximum A-Posteriori Probability (MAP) rule [91] as her strategy in distinguishing
OTF packets. Let H1 be the hypothesis that packet i is in Alice and Bob’s OTF and H0 otherwise.
Assuming that packet iE is the same packet i which is simultaneously received by Bob, according
to the MAP decision rule, for the received feedback FiE 6= 0 by Eve, she decides that packet iE
belongs to OTF set if

P r[H1 |FiE , Ewi = 0] > P r[H0 |FiE , Ewi = 0],
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(3.6)

Ewi indicates the random variable Ew associated with one-time transmission of packet iE , i.e.
Ewi = 0 means packet iE is received correctly by Eve. The following theorem with the provided
proof in Appendix 6.4 gives us a more explicit idea about Eve’s decision rule.
Theorem 3. Assume that Eve makes a decision based on the MAP rules in Eq. (3.6). Then, for
a correctly received packet when she receives feedback 1, she makes a decision in favor of H1 if
Γ > 0, where Γ is defined as
Γ , 1 − 2η − θ + 2ψ

p
ηθ(1 − η)(1 − θ) + 2ηθ.

(3.7)

On the other hand, when she receives an erased feedback, she makes decision in favor of H1 if
Λ > 0 which is defined as
h

i
p
Λ , 2 (1 − δ)(1 − ε)θ + ρθ εδ(1 − ε)(1 − δ) .
i
h
p
(1 − η)(1 − ε)θ − ψ(1 − ε) ηθ(1 − η)(1 − θ) − (1 − ε)θ.

(3.8)

Accordingly, the pseudo-code for Eve’s attack strategy in distinguishing OTF packets is presented in Table 3.4.
TABLE 3.4. Eve’s Attack strategy

If packet iE is received correctly, check SRiE
If SRiE = 1, then iE is not in OTF, Else, wait for feedback FiE
If FiE = 0, then iE is not in OTF
Else if PiE +1 6= PiE , then
If FiE = 1 and Γ > 0, put iE into OTF
Else if FiE = e and Λ > 0, put iE into OTF
Else iE is not in OTF

In order to analyze Eve’s performance, we need to investigate how much discrepancy her OTF
has with the actual one, namely with what probability, she misses an OTF packet, called OTF
missing probability Pm , or chooses a non-OTF packet, called false OTF probability PF . Pm is the
probability that given hypothesis H1 has occurred for packet iE , Eve does not choose it as an OTF
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packet. PF is the probability that given hypothesis H0 , Eve puts iE into OTF. In Lemma 5, whose
proof is given in Appendix 6.5, we compute these probabilities.
Lemma 5. In our scheme, if Eve uses the proposed attack strategy, she misses one OTF packet
with the probability of
(1 − η − θ + q11 )(1 − δ − ε + p11 )
(1 − δ)(1 − η)
(θ − q11 )(1 − δ − ε + p11 ) ε − p11
+1(Λ<0)
+
.
(1 − η)(1 − δ)
1−δ

Pm =1(Γ<0)

(3.9)

Moreover, she puts a wrong packet into OTF with probability


PF =1(Λ>0) θ(δ − p11 ) + 1(Λ>0) q11 + 1(Γ>0) (η − q11 ) (1 − δ − ε + p11 ).

(3.10)

where 1A is the indicator function, which is equal to 1 when A holds. p11 and q11 are provided in
Eq. (3.4).

3.5

Eve’s Misalignment and OTF Mapping strategy

Whenever Eve has a miss-detection, by missing a packet or putting a wrong packet into OTF, assuming that her next OTF packets are selected correctly, her gathered OTF set respectively moves
one packet size backward or forward compared to the original set. Hereafter, she loses her OTF
alignment with Alice and Bob, and in order to realign with the users, she has to have the same
number of OTF missing events as the false OTF packets. However, If Alice and Bob take a strategy
by mapping OTF into a destination set where once a misalignment occurs, the resulted error propagates to upcoming packets, any miss-detection for Eve would be equivalent to missing the rest of
the transformed data.
A possible mapping strategy is a simple digital filter with a delayed feed back. Let Xi and
Wi denote respectively the ith packet in the original OTF and in the destination set, where i =
1, . . . , nts . After applying this transformation, whose block diagram is depicted in Fig. 3.2, Wi
will be the result of Xor of Xi and Wi−1 . Note that only the random body of each OTF packet
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FIGURE 3.2. Block diagram of the simple digital filter used for mapping OTF set

will be used in this mapping. Let Mmax be the maximum possible number of packets within the
frame. If each packet has size nb , by excluding the sequence number as well as two bit flags, only
nr = nb − log2 Mmax − 2 bits of each packet will be transformed, so Xi ’s have size nr , and the
generated destination set will be of size n = nts nr .
TABLE 3.5. Alice-Bob and Eve’s OTF and destination sets

OTFAB
OTFE
DSAB
DSE

X2
X3
X1 ⊕ X2
X1 ⊕ X3

X3
X3′
X1 ⊕ X2 ⊕ X3
X1 ⊕ X3 ⊕ X3′

X4
X4
X1 ⊕ X2 ⊕ X3 ⊕ X4
X1 ⊕ X3 ⊕ X3′ ⊕ X4

Consider a simple case when the number of packets within OTF set is nts = 4. In Tab. 3.5 Alice
and Bob’s OTF as OTFAB and Eve’s OTF as OTFE (starting from the second packet) are illustrated
when Eve misses X2 and has a false event by choosing X3′ . In this case even though OTFE has
missed its alignment at the second packet, it realigns with OTFAB at X4 resulting in only two
packet discrepancies between them. The resulted destination set for legitimate users as DSAB and
for Eve as DSE are given in Tab. 3.5. We assume that Xi ’s are generated uniform randomly, so
for instance for the third and the fourth packets in DSE , X2 ⊕ X3 behaves like an additive noise
with error rate of 0.5. That is why when a misalignment occurs, for the remaining packets in DSE ,
missed or false OTF packets act like additive noise to further deceive Eve. In other words, every
miss-detection causes an uncertainty for her that accumulates in upcoming packets, resulting in
a larger uncertainty for Eve in her destination set. In general, when there is a miss-detection at
j th packet, by utilizing the suggested mapping strategy, any realignment for Eve becomes highly
unlikely, and it can be guaranteed that there will be errors in the rest of nts − j packets of Eve’s
destination set.
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3.6

Secrecy Scheme Design and Analysis

Throughout transmission of each frame by using the ARQ protocol and mapping strategy, Alice
and Bob will generate a destination set upon which they both completely agree. When a function is
chosen uniform-randomly from a universal class of hash functions, regardless of what distribution
the actual input has, for sufficiently short output, the expected hash output will have a distribution
close to uniform with maximum entropy. By the last packet of the frame, Alice will transmit this
chosen function to Bob that will be applied over the produced destination set to extract secret keys,
later on being used as a symmetric key for encryption of the next frame. As a result, for a short hash
output they can make sure that Eve, given her knowledge, gets arbitrarily negligible information
about it.
In order to analyze the designed secrecy scheme, we define appropriate metrics whereby the
required secrecy and efficiency for the system can be regulated. We define outage probability as
the probability that the aimed information theoretic secrecy is not achieved, based on which system
parameters will be designed. Furthermore, we use secret key rate to measure secrecy throughput
and efficiency of the scheme.

3.6.1 Outage Probability based on a New Oracle Model
In [55], the additional information that a virtual oracle freely gives Eve is considered as an auxiliary
random variable that simplifies secrecy analysis for privacy amplification. Assume that a virtual
oracle freely informs Eve that in which packet she first missed her alignment with Alice-Bob OTF.
Let this packet be the Nc + 1st OTF packet, so that Eve knows with a high probability she has
observed Nc packets, with length t = Nc nr denoted by V , correctly from the actual destination
set W . Nonetheless, she will have error propagation in the remaining packets because of using the
proposed mapping strategy. Eve can not correct her mistake by using this additional information
because she has no idea what kind of miss-detection has occurred or what happened after this
misalignment. Literally, the secrecy that system obtains in the presence of this oracle provides a
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lower-bound of the actual secrecy that scheme could have gained without giving such a privilege
to Eve.
Let V = e(W ) and function e : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}t be an arbitrary eavesdropping function,
with t < n, where n = nts nr is the length of the input string W . Alice and Bob arbitrarily choose
a function G from a universal class of hash functions, mapping {0, 1}n into {0, 1}r , and then
apply it over W to get a secret key Q of size r, where r = n − t − s. According to Lemma 1
(corollary 4 in [55]), Eve’s expected information about the secret key, given G and V , satisfies
I(Q; G, V ) ≤ 2−s / ln 2. As information theoretic secrecy goal, if we require the upper-bound of
I(Q; GV ) to be Isup , the necessary s is
s = − log[ln(2)Isup ],

(3.11)

for logarithm of base 2. But n−t = r+s is the length of the input string after misalignment. Hence,
for the required s and given r, the minimum required number of packet discrepancies between two
sets denoted by l has to be


 

n−t
r+s
l=
=
.
nr
nr

(3.12)

Consequently, if we design the system in a way that with a high probability misalignment in OTF
set happens at one of the first nts − l + 1 OTF packets, we can make sure that after mapping, it is
very likely to have the number of different packets between V and W , denoted by Ne , be more than
l. We define outage probability as the probability that Ne < l, which actually is the probability that
determined secrecy goal as I ≤ Isup is not satisfied. The following Theorem, proven in Appendix
6.6, provides an upper-bound for outage probability.
Theorem 4. Let secrecy outage Pout be the probability that there exists less than l packet discrepancies between Eve’s destination set and the actual set. For the proposed secrecy scheme, Pout is
upper-bounded as
Pout



(1 − Pm )Pc
≤
1 − (1 − Pc )(1 − PF )
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nts −l+1

,

(3.13)

where nts is the number of packets in OTF. Pm , PF and Pc can be computed using Eq.’s (3.9),
(3.10) and (3.5).
Note that in our analysis we will consider the worst case scenario where equality in Eq. (3.13)
holds. Now we can determine the minimum average uncertainty that Eve has about the generated
secret key. Let W be a random n-bit string with uniform distribution over {0, 1}n , and V be the
random variable indicating what Eve observes correctly form W with the help of the oracle. Let
us define Pout as the probability that the length of V is larger than t bits for some t < n, and let
s < n−t be a positive safety parameter, such that r = n−t−s. With the probability 1−Pout , V will
take on values of v that belong to the set Av constituted of subsets of W with less than or equal to
t bits. In this case, as the most optimistic scenario for Eve, she will know t bits correctly out of W .
If Alice and Bob choose G as their universal hashing function from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}r , according
to corollary 5 in [55] her information about the secret key Q = G(W ) with length r will be upperbounded as I(Q; G, V = v) < 2−s / ln 2 or in other words H(Q|G, V = v) ≤ r − 2−s / ln 2. Since
this holds for every v ∈ Av , by statistical averaging over Av , Eve’s average entropy about Q given
G and V will be lower-bounded as
H(Q|GV ) ≥

X

v∈Av

Pv (V = v)H(Q|G, V = v) = P r(Av )[r − 2−s / ln 2]

= (1 − Pout )[r − 2−s / ln 2] ≥ (1 − Pout )r − 2−s / ln 2

(3.14)

For W with the length of nts nr , and t = (nts − l)nr bits, we can replace Pout with its upper-bound
in Eq. (3.13) to consider the most pessimistic scenario.

3.6.2 Secret Key Rate
The next step is to quantify and analyze efficiency of the designed secrecy system in terms of secret
key rate. First of all, we need to design system parameters including the size of OTF set and data
frame, to guarantee that the system is sufficiently secure. As will be described later, these are two
parameters that mainly affect efficiency of the system. In order to maintain a large uncertainty for
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Eve, according to Eq. (3.14), we need to have s large enough and Pout as small as possible. If s
is chosen based on the determined Isup in Eq. (3.11), with outage probability sufficiently close to
0, we can have a highly likely secure system, with Eve’s average entropy close to maximum. The
number of packets in OTF, nts , can be lower-bounded accordingly to have outage probability stay
below a threshold Tout chosen to be sufficiently small, i.e. Pout < Tout

nts = (l − 1) +


− log Tout
, where Pd = 1 − (1 − Pc )(1 − PF ).
log Pd − log[(1 − Pm )Pc ]

(3.15)

nts only takes integer values, and l is obtained by Eq. (3.12). Note that − log(Tout ) is positive.
We also need to have enough number of packets within each frame to make sure that the number
of OTF packets reaches to the threshold nts . The probability that a packet is in OTF is Pc . The total
number of packets being in OTF out of M packets has binomial distribution with parameter Pc . We
call the probability of having at least nts OTF packets within M packets, success probability and
denote it by Ps . In order to have enough number of packets within OTF set with a high probability,
we can choose a threshold Ts sufficiently close to 1 and determine the smallest M for which

M 
X
M
Pck (1 − Pc )M −k ≥ Ts .
Ps =
k
k=n

(3.16)

ts

Clearly, with increase in nts the required number of packets in a frame, i.e. M , goes up.
There is an outage probability 1 − Ps that the number of OTF packets does not reach to the
required threshold nts . When such an outage occurs, Alice and Bob can use the existing OTF
packets to complete OTF set. Suppose that Alice has already finished transmission of the whole
frame but the created OTF set still lacks h number of packets. In this case, since they both agree
on the nts − h accumulated OTF packets, one possible alternative would be OTF refilling protocol


which divides the existing OTF into h partitions with equal size of ntsh−h packets and then selects
one packet out of each subset in order to refill the remaining h vacant positions. Note that rarely

does this outage event occur for a well designed system, and hence its overall effect on Eve’s
knowledge will be negligible.
65

Secret key rate is the maximal rate R > 0 such that for every α > 0, there exists a public
communication over an insecure but authenticated channel, over which Alice and Bob who agree
upon a random data can generate keys Q and Q′ respectively, where Q = Q′ with probability
at least 1 − α. Also, I(Q; V ) ≤ α, and H(Q)/N ≥ R − α, where V is data observed by Eve,
and N is the number of channel uses [56]. In our secrecy scheme, Alice and Bob both agree on
a random data called destination set by using reconciliation protocol and mapping strategy, then
they transform it into the secret key Q of length r which is the same for both of them. Moreover,
according to Eq. (3.14) since H(Q) = r, we can compute Eve’s information about the key Q given
her knowledge G, V as I(Q; G, V ) = H(Q) − H(Q|G, V ) ≤ 2−s / ln 2 + Pout r. Namely, design
of a system with a very low outage probability and sufficiently large s results in a negligible key
information for Eve. As a result, we achieved the required public transmission and can compute
secret key rate as the length of the generated hash value over the total transmission cost which is
the number of channel uses including retransmissions.
Assume that for the designed key generating ARQ protocol, due to throughput requirements the
maximum number of allowed retransmissions per packet is set to be K. In our scheme, given that
a packet is received correctly, the probability that it is transmitted for R times with 1 ≤ R ≤ K + 1
is Pc (1 − Pc )R−1 . On the other hand, not being received correctly by Bob implies that the packet
was transmitted for K + 1 times. It is straightforward to show that the average number of trials per
packet denoted by µr is

µr =

1 − (1 − Pc )K+1
.
Pc

(3.17)

When M is fixed and also sufficiently large, by the Strong Law of Large numbers (SLL), the total
number of transmissions denoted by R for M packets in the frame will be M µr . For nb as the
number of bits per packet, the number of channel uses is Rnb bits. Since secret key rate is the ratio
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of the generated key entropy over all channel uses, it can be obtained as
Rs =

r
rPc
H(Q)
=
=
.
N
Rnb
[1 − (1 − Pc )K+1 ]M nb

(3.18)

It should be noted that when to meet the secrecy requirements, M is chosen to be the minimum
possible value for which Eq. (3.16) is satisfied, Rs gives us the maximum achievable key rate.
To study the trade-off between secrecy and efficiency of the system, we evaluate system performance in various settings of design parameters. If it is required to have a higher information
theoretic secrecy meaning that a lower upper-bound for Eve’s information about the key, i.e. Isup ,
is mandated, Eq.’s (3.11) and (3.12) show that higher s and l are needed. However, a system that is
designed to guarantee a higher discrepancy between Bob and Eve turns out to have a lower secret
key rate and a larger secrecy outage rate. That is because with decrease in the exponent of Eq.
(3.13) due to the increase in l since its base is less than 1, Pout ascends, whereas according to Eq.
(3.15) with increase in l, nts and consecutively M go up that brings about a lower Rs based on Eq.
(3.18). Accordingly, the threshold Isup should be precisely determined, otherwise unnecessarily
low Isup can negatively affect both secrecy and efficiency.
If for a fixed channel condition, and specified Isup and r resulting in a fixed l, the system designer
tailors to a higher secrecy or a lower secrecy outage rate by regulating a lower outage threshold
Tout , according to Eq. (3.15), it elevates nts that causes M to rise and Rs to descend. Conversely,
raising Rs by reducing M according to Eq. (3.16) lowers nts and causes Pout to ascend, as Eq.
(3.13) indicates. Namely, Pout increases with rising Rs , or having a higher efficiency requires a
lower secrecy and vice versa. This trade-off between secrecy and efficiency should be taken into
account in system architecture.

3.6.3 The Effect of Correlation on System Performance
To study the effect of correlation on the system secrecy, we need to investigate how it affects two
defined secrecy metrics. Suppose that with some fixed forward and backward erasure rates, for a
predetermined secrecy requirement, system parameters including nts , M and l are designed. We
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want to analyze how increase in correlation between erasures in main and eavesdropper channels
influences outage probability. We only consider the case Γ > 0 which is more conforming to the
real world conditions in which transmission error rates are much smaller than 0.5. For Λ > 0,
based on Eq.’s (3.9) and (3.10) we can obtain missing and false OTF probabilities as
p
ρ δε(1 − δ)(1 − ε)
ε − p11
Pm =
=ε−
,
1−δ
1−δ

(3.19)

PF = θδ + η(1 − δ − ε) + p11 (η − θ).
According to Eq. (3.4) with increase in ρ, p11 increases. Assuming that feedback erasure rates η
and θ are close to each other, the effect of p11 and consequently ρ on PF will be insignificant.
However, Eq. (3.19) shows that with rising ρ and therefore p11 , Pm falls that accordingly increases
Pout based on Eq. (3.13). Thus, for an already designed system, increase in correlation leads to
a larger outage rate. On the other hand, if we design new system parameters, with increase in ρ,
as a result of reduction in Pm , according to Eq. (3.15), system will require a larger nts as well
as a larger M to produce a lower secrecy key rate Rs . It is also intuitively correct that the more
correlated Eve’s forward channel erasures are with Bob’s, the more conforming her decisions about
the received packets to Bob’s, reducing her uncertainty, so that more data will be transmitted to
carry the same amount of uncertainty for her, thereby reducing secret key rate. In this case ψ does
not have any effect on Rs because for Λ, Γ > 0, according to Tab. 3.4, Eve’s decision does not
depend on whether the received feedback bit is erased, making her performance independent of
the correlation across backward channels. It could also be inferred from independence of Pm and
PF from ψ in Eq. (3.19).
For Λ < 0 by Eq.’s (3.9), (3.10), missing and false OTF probabilities can be rewritten as

Pm =

(θ − q11 )(1 − δ) + ε(1 − η)
1 + q11 − θ − η
− p11
,
(1 − η)(1 − δ)
(1 − δ)(1 − η)

PF = (η − q11 )(1 − δ − ε) + p11 (η − q11 ).
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(3.20)

In this scenario for already designed system, with increased ρ and then p11 , Pm decreases whereas
PF increases. However, from Eq.’s (3.20), when η and θ are much smaller than 1, the effect of p11
on increasing PF can be assumed to be negligible. This prevailing effect on reducing Pm causes
Pout to go up, by Eq. (3.13), and for a new design, according to Eq. (3.15), requires system to have
a larger nts and M reducing secret key rate. Unlike Λ > 0, here increase in ψ impacts system
performance as for an erased feedback, Eve decides not to put packet in OTF. For an already
designed system parameters, by Eq (3.4) once q11 rises with increase in ψ, according to Eq. (3.20),
both Pm and PF decrease causing Pout to increase. On the other hand, for a new design it reduces
Rs by requiring a larger nts . Overall, correlation in both forward and backward channels influences
secrecy and efficiency of the system in a negative way by decreasing Rs and increasing Pout .

3.7

Simulation Results

Our objective in simulations is to evaluate secrecy and efficiency of the designed scheme in various
channel conditions. We assume that there exists no discrepancy between Alice and Bob using reconciliation strategy, and that the number of packets in OTF always reaches to nts by OTF refilling
protocol. In these simulations, we require s = 20 implying that the upper-bound on Eve’s information about secret key does not exceed Isup = 2−20 / ln 2 which is sufficiently negligible. For the
maximum number of packets within each frame chosen to be Mmax = 4096 with each packet of
length nb = 78-bits, we exclude log2 4096 = 12 number of bits dedicated for sequence number as
well as two flag bits from the packet to get nr = 64-bit random part used for key establishment. For
the generated key length of r = 640-bit, according to Eq. (3.12), the minimum required number
of packet discrepancies for Eve will be l = 11. We set the thresholds Ts = 0.99, Tout = 0.01 and
choose K = 0, so packets can only be transmitted once.

3.7.1 Numerical Analysis Based on Secret Key Rate
In numerical analysis we experiment how secret key rate changes with varying correlation. It is
assumed that wiretap channel quality is better than the main channel as δ = η = 0.2 but ε =
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FIGURE 3.3. Obtained secret key rate in terms of forward and backward correlation coefficients with
δ = η = 0.2 and ε = θ = 0.1.

θ = 0.1. Then, for different forward and backward correlation coefficients, based on the secrecy
requirement Pout < Tout , nts and M are computed using Eq.’s (3.15), (3.16). Namely, for an upperbounded Pout , each ρ and ψ result in a different secret key rate Rs based on Eq. (3.18). For ψ < 0.2,
since Λ > 0, increase in ρ from 0 to 0.8 reduces Rs from 0.135 to 0.075 as illustrated in Fig. 3.3
which conforms with our analysis. As was expected, in this case ψ does not have any effect on
Rs . However, for ψ > 0.2, we get Λ < 0, and therefore with increase in ψ, secret key rate goes
down to about 0.04 for large ψ and ρ, as shown in Fig. 3.3. Note that correlation coefficients are
upper-bounded based on Eq. (3.2). These results show that even when Eve has a better channel
than legitimate users, our scheme can provide secrecy for the established key except for highly
correlated channel errors.

3.7.2 System Robustness Against Various Channel Conditions
In our simulation we study whether for all channel conditions, the designed system maintains its
robustness for required secrecy criterion, i.e. Pout < Tout . To study how forward channel erasure
rates influence system performance, throughout this simulation a consistent condition for feedback
channel as η = θ = 0.2, as well as fixed correlation coefficients ρ = ψ = 0.2 are considered. For
70

FIGURE 3.4. Simulated outage rate for different forward packet erasure rates in main and wiretap channels,
with ρ = ψ = 0.2 and η = θ = 0.2.

the predetermined Isup , we get l = 11, meaning that outage occurs when the number of mismatches
between Eve’s destination set and the actual set is less than 11. Suppose that Alice is aware of the
main and wiretap channel conditions such that for each different δ and ε, determines nts and M .
Then, for the designed system, with 50000 frames, we apply the OTF packet selection within
each frame based on Alice and Bob’s strategy in Tab.’s 3.2, 3.3 by simulating the erasure rates
on their packet and feedback receptions. Similarly, based on Eve’s strategy in Tab. 3.4, we find
Eve’s chosen OTF packets. For each frame, due to mapping strategy, the number of correct packets
in Eve’s destination sets is the number of packets in her OTF before the first mismatch which is
known to Eve by a virtual oracle. Then, by counting the number of frames with outage event we get
the average outage rate or experimental Pout for each channel condition. In Fig. 3.4, the simulated
outage rate is depicted for varying forward channel conditions. It illustrates that even when ε < δ,
namely when wiretap channel has advantage over the main channel, the experimental outage rate
is below 0.003 which is much lower than the required threshold Tout = 0.01, indicating that system
is sufficiently secure and robust.
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FIGURE 3.5. Simulated outage rate in terms of correlation coefficients across forward and backward channels, with δ = ε = 0.2 and η = θ = 0.2.

3.7.3 System Robustness Against Unknown Wiretap Channel
To study the situation in which Alice is unaware of wiretap channel condition, we conducted another simulation with the same secrecy parameters assuming that Alice designs the system and
determines nts , M based on a presumed correlation coefficients ρ = ψ = 0.2, such that this design remains consistent throughout the simulation. All channel erasure rates are supposed to be
fixed and equal to 0.2. Then, for different ρ, ψ’s simulation is run with 50000 frames to obtain the
average outage rate. In Fig. 3.5 the experimental secrecy outage rate is drawn in terms of various
forward and backward channel correlations. As it shows, for the most of the region, outage probability is very low, and the system is stable, but when ρ and ψ go above 0.4, outage rate rises very
sharply, with Pout remaining below Tout = 0.01 except for ρ, ψ > 0.7. As a result, even with the
lack of knowledge about wiretap channel correlations, the designed system remains sufficiently
secure except for very highly correlated case.
We repeat this simulation but this time with presumed wiretap channel erasure rates ε = θ = 0.2,
and correlation coefficients that are fixed and equal to 0.2. Then, we draw experimentally obtained
Pout in terms of the varying ε and θ in Fig. 3.6. It illustrates that backward erasure rate θ has little
effect on average secrecy outage rate except for very low ε’s. However, as forward erasure rate
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FIGURE 3.6. Simulated outage rate in terms of wiretap channel forward and backward erasure rates, with
ρ = ψ = 0.2 and δ = η = 0.2.

exceeds the presumed ε = 0.2, secrecy outage goes up steeply till it reaches to 0.006 for ε = 0
due to the reduction in Pm , never exceeding the threshold 0.01. These two simulations show that
without prior knowledge about Eve’s channel conditions, system preserves its robustness from
secrecy point of view. Note that simulated outage probability shows much better results than the
numerically computed outage rate in Eq. (3.13) because system is designed based on the upperbound for the actual outage probability (as explained in Appendix 6.6). It provides a pessimistic
design of the protocol giving a safety margin when presumptions about channel conditions no
longer hold.

3.8

Conclusion

In this chapter, a key scheduling scheme based on ARQ mechanism and privacy amplification is
studied. We considered a correlated main and wiretap channel model with noisy feedback channels.
The system is designed and its secrecy is analyzed based on outage probability and secret key rate.
With numerical and theoretical analysis we showed that correlation between Eve’s and legitimate
users transmission errors has negative effect on system secrecy. The conducted simulations proved
that this scheme delivers its security and maintains its stability even when wiretapper has advan73

tage over legitimate users in channel quality or when wiretap channel conditions are unknown to
legitimate users.
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Chapter 4
Two-Layer Secrecy System with Exponential
Security Against Unbounded Adversary
This chapter is based on our work in [17]. In this work tailoring to any presumed condition on communication channel or any restriction on adversary’s resources we design a secrecy scheme with
information leakage that decays at an exponential rate. The only requirement for such an exponentially secure system is existence of a common key source between legitimate users that is partially
known by Eve. A key extractor based on a sampler and a Rényi extractor derives secret keys with
the required entropy from this source. A general cipher uses this key to ensure the required equivocation for the plaintext and to establish the first layer of secrecy. Using privacy amplification on
top of this cipher based on inverse universal2 hashing constitutes the second layer of secrecy for
highly confidential message transmission with information leakage that is exponentially decreasing. We provide secrecy exponent analysis and optimization to minimize information leakage in
terms of two metrics: mutual information and Eve’s distinguishability based on L1 norm distance
from uniformity. The required key rate is characterized for different source entropies in order to
guarantee the secrecy that is demanded in terms of secrecy exponent for the second secrecy layer
and Eve’s error rate for the first layer.

4.1

Introduction

The basic secrecy system includes a sender Alice who attempts to transmit as many messages as
possible to Bob, which are secured against an eavesdropper who attempts to attain the source information from Alice based on her prior knowledge and observation. In order to design and optimize
a secrecy system, we need to evaluate its secrecy by quantifying the amount of information leaked
to Eve.
In our secrecy model we consider an unbounded passive adversary and first measure information
leakage in terms of mutual information between Alice and Eve’s variables. Some works in infor75

mation theory community adopted information leakage based on mutual information as secrecy
criterion [1, 9, 47]. These works only consider a security metric based on mutual information
which is required to be negligible for uniformly distributed random message sources. However, in
reality, we cannot expect any finitely long messages to be uniformly random since no universally
source independent compression exists for such finite sources [62]. Rather, we use a stronger notion
of security and require that mutual information to be negligible for any given message distribution.
In cryptography community, security of ciphers has been mainly evaluated on the basis of
computationally based metrics against resource constrained attackers. However, recently some
researchers have used statistical measures, like variational distance, as secrecy criterion against
adversary with unbounded computational power [4–7]. Variational distance is closely related to
practical notions of secrecy like Eve’s distinguishability and can be used to provide a universally
composable notion of secrecy that allows to express secrecy requirement for any protocol environment. As in [7] Eve’s distinguishability is defined as half of the L1 norm distance that is closely
related to universal composable security. We adopt Eve’s distinguishability based on L1 distance
as another metric to evaluate information leakage from cryptographic point of view.
As studied by [55, 56, 93] in privacy amplification when equivocation of the original information
source is larger than the random number generation rate, it is possible to generate a random variable
about which Eve’s information converges to zero asymptotically. In realistic setting the speed of
convergence is of paramount importance because we can only manipulate finite length of random
variables. In information theory community the rate of exponential decrease, i.e. error exponent,
has been widely discussed [9, 58, 94].
Some works have utilized privacy amplification in the context of physical layer secrecy [58, 63,
95]. Hayashi in [58] showed that when input has equivocation in terms of Rényi entropy of order
1 + α, after application of universal2 hash function, Eve’s information about the generated random
variable decreases at an exponential rate that can be lower-bounded. This bound is more generalized and in some cases even tighter than the bound obtained by Bennett in [55]. In [63] Hayashi
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also provided a lower-bound of the L1 distance between the output of universal hashing and the
uniform random number. However, these works similar to the most of work done in physical layer
secrecy (as described in [96]) make some presumptions and require some knowledge about physical channel conditions. Conversely, we do not rely on any physical channel, instead we consider
end-to-end secrecy which can be multihop or through internet.
As the only advantage over adversary, we assume that legitimate users have an initial source of
randomness in common that is not uniformly distributed for which Eve has some partial knowledge. Such assumption was also made in previous works [6, 10]. This random data shared between
Alice and Bob does not need to be absolutely secret, and obtaining such a randomness through
public discussion or reconciliation is much easier than providing completely secret bits. In particular, extracted keys in many applications can be repeatedly derived from this source by each
time independently sampling of it. This initial key source can be generated through outputs of an
imperfect random number generator, a statistical sampler [10] from unpredictable events or a key
exchange protocol such as the technique, we used in Chapter 3. Although we consider error free
physical channel, physical layer and wireless channel characteristics in wiretap channel model can
be used as another means to create such correlated randomness whereby the required keys can be
extracted [51].
Utilizing a general cipher like Shannon-type cipher can guarantee the required secrecy for encrypted message in terms of equivocation given Eve’s knowledge. The question we address is
that how on top of this cipher we can leverage the existing uncertainty about this weak source
of randomness to ensure that decreasing exponent of information leakage against an unbounded
adversary is sufficiently large making its secrecy asymptotically close to perfect secrecy. For this
purpose, we adopt privacy amplification using an invertible universal2 hash function [4] based on
⊙ multiplication in GF(q n ) that can be implemented with less amount of calculation than most
physical layer secrecy approaches whose construction resort to some sophisticated error correction
codings [28]. Our contribution can be itemized as:
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1. We design a two-layer secrecy scheme in which the privileged advantage for Alice and Bob,
that is quantified by Eve’s prior uncertainty about the key source, is amplified by an extractor,
an inverse universal hash, and a general cipher. In the first layer, enciphering with a secure
key assures the required equivocation for regular message transmission that are encapsulated
into plaintext blocks. The second layer secrecy that provides exponential secrecy consists of
an inverse universal hash operation that transforms the input source message into multiple
plaintext blocks being encrypted using the extracted key. At the receiver end after deciphering and recovering these blocks, and then applying universal hash over them, information
that leaks to an unbounded adversary and is measured in terms of mutual information and
L1 distance approaches zero at an exponential rate.
2. In this two-layer secrecy scheme with a given random number generation rate and source
distribution we provide exponent analysis for both mutual information and L1 distance as
metrics of security. Our secrecy analysis demonstrates quantitatively how the obtained exponent relies on the entropy of the message source as well as Eve’s prior information about
the key source.
3. We adopt a key extractor that samples a data frame from this partially secure key source
and then utilizes an extractor to obtain the cipher key with the required Rényi entropy. All
existing extractors measure the extracted randomness in terms of statistical distance from
uniformity [97]. In our scheme privacy amplification is based on an uncertainty measures
using Rényi entropy, and hence we develop a new notion of extractor that extracts the required randomness on the basis of Rényi entropy. What is notable is that Rényi entropy is a
stronger secrecy measure compared to statistical distance.
4. For a particular case where source messages consist of independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) symbols, we optimize the Rényi entropy order to maximize the lower-bound
for secrecy exponent. We characterize the required key generation rate that guarantees achiev78

able secrecy for both secrecy layers. For the second layer that is used for transmission of
highly confidential part of the message, secrecy is determined in terms of decreasing exponent of information leakage measured by variational distance and mutual information. For
the first layer used for regular message transmission, secrecy is measured in terms of adversary’s error probability in cryptanalysis also called decryption error probability.
In [4] a similar analysis is used where encryption in utilized to provide underlying secrecy
measured in terms of correct decryption probability over which by applying privacy amplification
a higher level of secrecy is built up measured in terms of distinguishing security. What mainly
distinguishes our work from Bellare et.al. work in [4] is that here we also reach to the goal of
exponential secrecy where Eve’s advantage vanishes at exponential rate, and moreover unlike their
work we do not rely on any physical channel error.
In Section 4.2 the whole scheme of design as well as denotations are illustrated. Section 4.3 discusses a construction of universal2 hashing that is utilized in this work. Key extractor and cipher are
described and analyzed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. Privacy amplification and exponent
analysis based on mutual information and variational distance metrics are detailed in Section 4.6.
Numerical analysis and optimization based on dual mode transmission are presented in Section
4.7, and then we conclude in Section 4.8. Proofs for this Chapter are also given in Appendix.

4.2

Proposed Secrecy Scheme model

The transmitter and the receiver side of our proposed secrecy scheme are shown in Fig. 4.1 and 4.2
respectively. We assume that there exists a source of information denoted by V about which Eve
has a lower-bounded uncertainty measured in terms of Rényi entropy. Key extractor module that
is shown in Fig. 4.3 is used to derive nearly uniform secret key from this weakly random source
of data. By independently sampling a segment of this source at time i we obtain a data frame Λi
that will have the required randomness given Eve’s knowledge in terms of Rényi entropy. We show
that a key Qi can be extracted out of Λi , by using extractor based on universal hashing, with Rényi
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FIGURE 4.1. Transmitter side in the proposed secrecy scheme

FIGURE 4.2. Receiver side in the proposed secrecy scheme

entropy that is asymptotically close to the maximum value. This generated key can be used as a
symmetric key for encryption in a general cipher.
Consider a uniformly distributed and randomly chosen function from a universal class of hash
functions that is applied upon a source of data with a sufficient equivocation (conditional Rényi
entropy given Eve’s knowledge). It is proven in [58, 63] that the generated output hash value will
have exponentially decreasing information leakage measured in terms of mutual information or L1
norm distance from uniform distribution.

FIGURE 4.3. Key extractor from a weakly random source
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As shown in Fig. 4.1, the secure transmission mechanism is applied over a sequence of l blocks
with the size of b-symbols. As convention a message block at time i is shown as Ai , with symbols of
{Ai1 , Ai2 , . . . , Aib }. A sequence of l concatenated blocks is denoted as A(l) = {A1 , A2 , . . . , Al }. Inverse universal hash maps this sequence into a sequence of plaintext blocks {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X l } using the same random seed S that is publicly known and a sequence of random vectors {R1 , R2 , . . . , Rl }
that are uniformly generated. In our scheme we consider an invertible universal hash function based
on modulo n multiplication in GF (q n ). Inverse universal hash maps its input into its pre-image
that increases its length by adding some randomness through binning. This mapping has a similar functionality as the homophonic encoder in approach proposed in [73] or the random binning
based encoding proposed by Wyner and Ciszar in [1, 9]. However, our adopted inverse universal
hashing can be considered as a particular encoding approach tailored to Eve’s uncertainty over the
key source.
Each of the generated n-symbol plaintext blocks at the output of inverse universal hash function
will be encrypted independently using a general cipher. The cipher is comprised of a key stream
generator to derive key stream C i from this key Qi as well as a combiner that combines this key
stream with the plaintext block X i . For i = 1, . . . , l, this encryption results in a sequence of
ciphertexts Y (l) = {Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . , Y l }, that will be transmitted to Bob and eavesdropped by Eve.
Key extractor and the cipher constitute the first layer of secrecy that ensures sufficient equivocation of plaintext blocks provided that the extracted key has the required Rényi entropy. Upon
receiving these ciphertexts, Bob has the same initial key source V and uses inverse mappings to
recover the plaintext sequence X (l) = {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X l } with a sufficient equivocation. As will be
stated in Theorems 7 and 8, after applying the universal hash over this sequence, Eve’s information
about the resorted message sequence A(l) approaches zero exponentially fast, whose exponent can
be bounded properly.
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4.3

Universal2 hashing

We adopt universal hashing for privacy amplification and key extraction. An ensemble of the functions hs that maps set Ω to {1, . . . , M }, where S determines statistical behavior of the function h,
is called universal2 when it satisfies the following conditions [93]:
Condition 1: ∀x1 6= x2 ∈ Ω, the probability that hs (x1 ) = hs (x2 ) is at most

1
.
M

Condition 2: For any S, the cardinality of h−1
s {i} is independent of the input i.
To make this concrete we give an example of a universal2 hash function with an efficiently
computable inverter that can be used for key derivation and privacy amplification in our scheme.
The construction was used in [4] as randomness extractor. Here, we use a more general symbolwise format of this construction. If we interpret n-symbol strings as elements of the finite field
GF(q n ), we shall define a multiplication operator ⊙ on them. Let set Ω be {0, . . . , q − 1} and
consider seed S that is drawn uniformly from the set SD = Ωn \0n . We define the universal hash
function h : SD × Ωn → Ωb that operates on inputs X ∈ Ωn and S ∈ SD to output the first
truncated b-symbols of X ⊙ S as A = h(X, S) = truncb (X ⊙ S).
Let S −1 be the inverse of S with respect to multiplication in GF(q n ). Then, we can efficiently invert this universal hashing by the function h−1 : SD × Ωn−b × Ωb → Ωn defined as h−1 (S, R, A) =
(A||R) ⊙ S −1 , for R uniform over Ωn−b . In Appendix 6.7 we show that both conditions 1 and 2
hold for this function, meaning that in addition to uniformity of the the output hash value, every
point in the range has the same number of preimages.

4.4

Key Extractor

With the existence of an initial key source that contains some good amount of randomness but is
non-uniformly distributed or partially known by Eve, we need to design a key extracting function
based on essential cryptographic components that derives required keys from this imperfect source
with a randomness close to uniform. The assumption on existence of such a source was also used
in some key extracting techniques like [6, 10]. This random data can be produced through different
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means such as hardware devices based on thermal noise, statistical sampling of user’s keyboard
strokes or timing data obtained from the hard disk or packet transmission in a network [6].
Consider random variable V common between Alice and Bob, consisting of ν random variables
as V = (V1 , V2 , . . . , Vν ) that is used as initial keying source. This keying source V gathered by
users has to contain enough uncertainty at Eve’s side in terms of Rényi entropy of order 2 denoted
by H2 (V ). As shown in Fig. 4.3 the first step in key extractor is a sampling module that each time
independently samples a λ-tuple from this source such that each symbol can only be sampled once.
For any λ-tuple i = (i1 , i2 , . . . , iλ ) with 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < . . . < iλ ≤ ν let Vi be the sampled string
(Vi1 , Vi2 , . . . , Viλ ). Then, it is shown in [98] that
H2 (Vi ) ≥ H2 (V ) − (ν − λ).

(4.1)

For H2 (V ) − (ν − λ) = δ if we denote the randomly sampled λ-tuple string at time i as Λi , it will
have collision entropy of at least δ. Rényi entropy is a decreasing function with respect to its order
[20], so H1+α (Λi ) ≥ H2 (Λi ) ≥ δ for 0 < α ≤ 1, and Eve’s uncertainty about the sampled output
in terms of Rényi entropy of order 1 + α will be at least δ.
Randomness extractors are well suited to address the need for key derivation functionality which
maps input distributions with sufficient entropy into outputs with distributions statistically close
to uniform [97]. To the best of authors’ knowledge, so far all definitions of extractors measure
randomness of the extracted output on the basis of statistical distance from uniformity. However,
since in our scheme privacy amplification is characterized based on Rényi entropy, we need to
develop a new notion of extractor that extracts randomness in terms of Rényi entropy. Therefore,
we resort to the use of cryptographic hash functions as the basis for such extractor. We prove the
following Theorem in Appendix 6.8.
Theorem 5. Consider a universal class of hash functions hs : Ω → K; where S is uniform over
SD. If we apply hs over input X ∈ Ω with Rényi entropy of H1+α (X) ≥ δ, for 0 < α ≤ 1,
the generated hash value Q = hs (X) such that Q ∈ K attains Rényi entropy with the following
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lower-bound
H1+α (Q) ≥ log |K| −

1 −α[δ−log |K|]
e
.
α

(4.2)

Now, we can define the new notion of Rényi extractor:
Definition 2. RenExt: Ω × SD → K is a (δ, ε) Rény extractor if for every seed S uniformly chosen
on SD and every source X ∈ Ω of Rényi entropy H2 (X) ≥ δ, it holds that RenExt(X, S) has
Rényi entropy of at least log |K| − ε.
Rényi extractor based on universal hashing results in entropy loss ε which is exponentially decreasing. By applying this Rényi extractor over sampled data frame Λi which has Rényi entropy of
at least δ, provided that δ > log |K|, we obtain a key Qi ∈ K with Rény entrpy
H1+α (Qi ) ≥ log |K| −

1 −α[δ−log |K|]
e
= log |K| − ε.
α

(4.3)

If we adopt universal hashing technique based on ⊙ multiplication in GF(q n ) for key extraction,
we need to use independent seeds for each key derivation. It ensures that then due to independent
sampling and mapping used in key extractor the generated keys will be independent of each other.

4.5

Cipher

Consider a deterministic cipher that consists of a key stream generator and a combiner. Let the
plaintext block at time i be X i = (X1i , X2i , . . . , Xni ) where Xji ∈ Ω. The key extractor output is Qi
that takes values in the set K with total of enRs elements. At time i key stream generator maps the
input key Qi to the key stream of length n, C i = (C1i , C2i , . . . , Cni ) with components from the set
Ω using the mapping Φ : K → Ωn . We define the cipher as the set C ∗ = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C e
key streams with length n and key rate of Rs =

nRs

} of

log |K|
.
n

For i = 1, . . . , l the cipher produces the ciphertext block Y i from the ith plaintext block X i and
the ith key stream C i using the combiner f (., .) that maps Ωn × Ωn → Ωn .
Y i = f (X i , C i )
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i = 1, 2, · · · .

(4.4)

Bob is aware of the key Qi used at time i and can generate the same key stream C i using key
stream generator. He applies inverse mapping g(., .) to the received ciphertext block C i in order to
recover the plaintext block X i , where g : Ωn × Ωn → Ωn and X i = g(Y i , C i ). Depending on the
mapping f , the cipher could be block, stream cipher, or additive-like cipher.
Now the question is how much Eve knows about the plaintext. She has knowledge about the
system and all the mappings and can receive ciphertexts. However, she lacks a complete knowledge, thereby resulting in uncertainty about the cipher key. We use the following Lemma, proven
in Appendix 6.9, in Theorem 6 to quantify equivocation of the plaintext in terms of Rényi entropy.

Lemma 6. For conditional Rényi entropy of order 1 + α with α > 0 we have
H1+α (X|Y ) ≥ H1+α (X, Y ) − H(Y ).

(4.5)

Theorem 6. Let X = (X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn ), Y = (Y1 , Y2 , . . . , Yn ) and C = (C1 , C2 , . . . , Cn ) be random vectors representing plaintext block, ciphertext block and the key stream, respectively, where
Xi , Yi , Ci ∈ Ω. Let Q denote the random vector representing the key. For α > 0, equivocation of
the plaintext satisfies
H1+α (X|Y ) ≥ H1+α (X) + H1+α (Q) − n log |Ω|.

(4.6)

Proof. Let H1+α (X, Y ) be the joint Rényi entropy of the plaintext and ciphertext. Since f (., .) is
a one-to-one mapping, it is easy to see that H1+α (X, Y ) = H1+α (X, C). But we know that the
key stream C is independent of the input plaintext X implying that H1+α (X, C) = H1+α (X) +
H1+α (C). Moreover, key stream generator that uses mapping Φ does not increase entropy against
adversary and therefore Eve’s lack of knowledge about the key Q will be transformed to her uncertainty about the key stream C, i.e. H1+α (C) = H1+α (Q). For Y ∈ Ωn we have H(Y ) ≤ n log |Ω|.
Then, using by Eq. (4.5) gives us the equivocation of order 1 + α.
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In our secrecy analysis we will only consider 0 < α ≤ 1. To measure redundancy of the input
plaintext X we use Rényi divergence of order 1 + α as D1+α (PX ||P̃X ) where P̃X is uniform
distribution over Ωn . If we define normalized redundancy of X as dX
α , D1+α (PX ||P̃X )/n, we
will have
H1+α (X) = n log |Ω| − ndX
α.

(4.7)

As a result, we can rewrite Eq. (4.6) as
H1+α (X|Y ) ≥ H1+α (Q) − ndX
α.

(4.8)

The key generation rate Rs has to be specified in order to guarantee the required secrecy for
the first layer of the scheme including the cipher and key extractor. It aims at a minimum required
equivocation for Eve about the message that can be characterized in terms of the average error
probability in Eve’s estimation of the plaintext block. Let X ∗ be the estimate of adversary from
the plaintext block X based on the maximum aposteriori probability (MAP) given the received
ciphertext Y as X ∗ = maxX∈Ωn P r[X|Y ]. MAP decision rule minimizes the average probability
of error per plaintext block defined as
Pe = 1 − EY [ maxn P r(X|Y )].
X∈Ω

(4.9)

As it is proven in [99], Rényi entropy can be used to bound error probability of MAP decision rule
based on an analogue of Fano’s lemma that is stated below:
Theorem 6 in [99]: Let P be the set of aposteriori probabilities as P = {P1 , P2 , . . . , Pm }, and
Hβ (P ) be the conditional Rényi entropy that is defined based on P . Let estimation error probability
be Pe = 1 − max Pi . Then, for β 6= 1 the maximum upper-bound for Hβ (P ) is attained as


1
1
β
β−1 β
h̄β (Pe ) =
(4.10)
log (1 − Pe ) + (
) Pe .
1−β
m−1
In plaintext estimation by adversary, with aposteriori probability of P r(X|Y ) and estimation
error probability given in Eq. (4.9), noting that X belongs to the alphabet of size |Ω|n , we can
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obtain the upper-bound for conditional Rényi entropy of order 1 + α with 0 < α ≤ 1 as


1
1
1+α
α 1+α
H1+α (X|Y ) ≤ h̄1+α (Pe ) = − log (1 − Pe )
, α > 0.
+( n
) Pe
α
|Ω| − 1

(4.11)

We adopt error probability of attacker in estimation of the plaintext block using MAP as the secrecy
metric for the first layer of the scheme. Such metric was also used in previous works [66, 68] as
secrecy criterion. Let us determine a threshold as Peth and design the system with a key stream
generation rate assuring that Eve’s block error probability exceeds this threshold. It is easy to see
that for 0 < α ≤ 1, h̄1+α (Pe ) is a monotonic increasing function of Pe . In other words, if we ensure
that h̄1+α (Peth ) ≤ H1+α (X|Y ) due to inequality (4.11) and monotonic behavior of h̄1+α (Pe ) we
will have h̄1+α (Pe ) ≥ h̄1+α (Peth ) that infers Pe ≥ Peth . Let τα , h̄1+α (Peth ), so we need to make
sure that equivocation in Eq. (4.8) never drops below τα , which requires that
H1+α (Q) − ndX
α ≥ τα .

(4.12)

If we use our proposed key extracting technique, H1+α (Q) can be lower-bounded according to Eq.
(4.2). Then, for the above inequality to hold we need to have
log |K| ≥ ndX
α + τα +

1 −α(δ−log |K|)
e
,
α

(4.13)

Hence, we can infer that key stream generation rate has to be
Rs ≥

dX
α

τα + α1 e−α(δ−log |K|)
.
+
n

(4.14)

It characterizes the minimum required key rate for the first layer of secrecy. Note that we require
δ > log |K|.

4.6

Privacy Amplification

4.6.1 Secrecy Exponent Analysis Based on Mutual Information
The main objective of using universal hashing in our scheme is bringing secrecy up to the second
layer by privacy amplification. Let hs be an ensemble of universal hash functions that maps set
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Ωn to {1, . . . , M } and satisfies both conditions 1 and 2. As proven in [58], information leakage in
terms of mutual information, averaged over possible seeds S, satisfies
e−α(H1+α (X|Y )−log M )
.
0<α≤1
α

Es [I(hs (X); Y )] ≤ min

(4.15)

So we can find a function hs from Ωn to {1, . . . , M } that
e−α(H1+α (X|Y )−log M )
,
0<α≤1
α

I(hs (X); Y ) ≤ min

(4.16)

where Y denotes the obtained knowledge by Eve. Eq. (4.16) implies that when legitimate users
have a common randomness denoted by X with equivocation of at least H1+α (X|Y ), we can
make sure that the upper-bound for Eve’s knowledge about the output of hs (X) decreases with the
exponent of α(H1+α (X|Y ) − log M ). The larger this exponent is, the closer system secrecy will
be to the perfect secrecy with zero information leakage, i.e. I(hs (X); Y ) = 0.
In our scheme Alice and Bob exchange random vector X through encryption that enables them
to have a shared body of random data with equivocation of H1+α (X|Y ). As the next step if we
apply the universal hash function based on ⊙ multiplication in GF(q n ), that maps Ωn to Ωb , it can
be assured that output A = hs (X) will have information leakage with the decreasing exponent
of at least α(H1+α (X|Y ) − log M ), for M = |Ωb |. Now if we reverse this process and obtain X
from input A using inverse universal hash that maps Ωb to Ωn , we will get the same results since
condition 2 guarantees that the cardinality |h−1
s (A)| does not depend on A. Let Alice generate
−1
uniformly random string R over Ωn−b and apply inverse function h−1
s over the input A, R and S

to obtain plaintext X = (A||R) ⊙ S −1 . Then, decreasing exponent of information leakage about A
will be at least α(H1+α (X|Y ) − log M ).
Consider l-fold scenario of the abovementioned mechanism where input message is framed
into a sequence of l blocks denoted by A(l) = {A1 , A2 , . . . , Al } for Ai ∈ Ωb . Alice generates
the sequence of l uniformly random (n − b)-symbol strings R(l) = {R1 , R2 , . . . , Rl }, and then
by using inverse universal hash, outputs X i = (Ai ||Ri ) ⊙ S −1 , to map A(l) to the sequence of
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plaintexts X (l) = {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X l }. Through encryption using the sequence of l key streams
C (l) = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C l } that are generated using the cipher keys {Q1 , Q2 , . . . , Ql }, X (l) will be
mapped to the sequence of ciphertexts Y (l) = {Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . , Y l } as Y i = f (X i , C i ). Let A(l) ∈ I.
We can obtain the random number generation rate in this l-fold transmission mechanism as
log |I|
log |Ωb |l
= lim
= log |Ωb | = log M.
l→∞
l→∞
l
l

ρ , lim

(4.17)

At the receiver end after deciphering and recovering of X (l) that contains l plaintext blocks,
universal hashing will be applied over them to restore message blocks as Ai = truncb (X i ⊙ S).
Note that the same seed S, uniformly chosen over Ωn , is used for hashing of all l blocks that
has to be publicly known before their transmission. We define mutual information based secrecy
exponent for l-fold scenario as
(l)

− log I(h(l) (X (l) ); Y (l) )
,
l→∞
l

eI , lim

(4.18)

whose lower-bound is given in the following Theorem:
Theorem 7. Let random variable A represent the message block of size b with components in set
Ω where M = |Ωb | and Q represent the cipher key. Then, for the described l-fold transmission
mechanism in two layer secrecy scheme, mutual information based secrecy exponent satisfies:
(l)

eI ≥ max α(H1+α (Q) + H1+α (A) − 2 log M ).
0<α≤1

(4.19)

Proof. Since Ri and Ai are independent of Rj and Aj for i 6= j, for a given S, X i and X j will be
independent of each other. Namely, revealing any information about any of the plaintexts does not
assist Eve to reduce her uncertainty about other ones. Consequently, we shall write
H1+α (X (l) |Y (l) ) = lH1+α (X i |Y i ) = lH1+α (X|Y ).

(4.20)

We use Cartesian product construction of universal class of hash functions in order to enlarge the
domain of hash family. In this construction hashed outputs, that are generated using hash function
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with the same seed, are concatenated, where h(l) (X (l) ) is defined as hs (X 1 )||hs (X 2 )|| . . . ||hs (X l ).
Stinson showed in [100] that Cartesian product based universal hashing denoted by h(l) results in
the same collision probability as hs . Namely, using only one seed for l transformations does not
compromise security.
At receiver l-fold universal hash function h(l) maps X (l) to A(l) . Joint distribution of X (l) and
Y (l) denoted by PX (l) ,Y (l) can be obtained by l-fold identical and independent distribution of PX,Y
as (PX,Y )l , so we can infer from Eq. (4.20) that
(l)

(l)

I(h (X ); Y

(l)

) ≤ min

e−α(H1+α (X

(l) |Y (l) )−log |Ab |l )

α

0<α≤1

= min

e

−αl(H1+α (X|Y )−log |Ab |)

0<α≤1

α

.

(4.21)

(l)

According to Eq. (4.21), eI can be obtained by
(l)

eI ≥ max α(H1+α (X|Y ) − log M ).
0<α≤1

(4.22)

Based on the secrecy analysis for the first layer of the scheme which is constituted of the cipher and
the key extractor, we obtained equivocation of each plaintext block in Eq. (4.8). On the other hand,
redundancy of the plaintext can be quantified in terms of entropy of the message block from which
it is derived using inverted universal hashing. Random vector R is of size n − b with components
in the set Ω meaning that R is uniformly generated over Ωn−b . For a given seed S, distribution of
random vector X that is obtained as X = (A||R) ⊙ S −1 is determined based on the distribution of
R and input A that are independent of each other. As a result,
PX (X|S) = PA (A).PR (R) =

PR (A)
.
|Ω|n−b

(4.23)

Thus, we can compute Rényi entropy of the plaintext X
H1+α (X) = (n − b) log |Ω| + H1+α (A).

(4.24)

Replacing Eq. (4.6) in this Eq. shows that equivocation satisfies
H1+α (X|Y ) ≥ H1+α (Q) + H1+α (A) − log M.
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(4.25)

Then, substituting it in Eq. (4.22) gives us the desired lower bound of the secrecy exponent in Eq.
(4.19).
Eq. (4.19) indicates that the decreasing exponent of information leakage depends only on the
entropy of the generated key, uncertainty about the source message as well as the random number
generation rate. Note that initial source V will be used for encryption of l blocks such that l keys
has to be derived out of l times λ-tuple sampling of it, therefore its length ν should satisfy ν ≥ lλ.
To have positive secrecy exponent for a source with the entropy of H1+α (A), extracted key entropy
for single block encryption has to be at least
H1+α (Q) ≥ 2 log M − H1+α (A).

(4.26)

By replacing the entropy for extracted key given in Eq. (4.2), and defining γ , δ − log |K|, we get
the following requirement for key size
log |K| ≥ 2 log M +

1 −γ
e − H1+α (A) where γ > 0.
α

(4.27)

This condition guarantees exponential security for highly confidential message transmission.

4.6.2 Secrecy Exponent Analysis Based on L1 distance
We use Eve’s distinguishability as the second metric to characterize leaked information. Hayashi
in [63] adopted it as secrecy criterion that is close to the universal composable security used in [7].
Consider an ensemble of functions hs that maps the random number X ∈ Ωn to {1, 2, . . . , M }
satisfying both universality conditions. Alice and Bob apply the same function to the common
random variable X to obtain hs (X). Let Y ∈ Ω be the random variable representing Eve’s knowledge where Phs (X),Y denotes the joint distribution of hs (X) and Y . Let P̃hs (X) be the uniform
distribution on {1, 2, . . . , M }. Eve’s distinguishability is defined [63] as
d1 (Phs (X),Y |Y ) = d1 (Phs (X),Y , P̃hs (X) × PY ).
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(4.28)

According to Eq. (1.2) it can be rewritten as
d1 (Phs (X),Y |Y ) =

X

PY (y)d1 (Phs (X)|Y =y , P̃hs (X) ).

(4.29)

y

It measures randomness of the output value of a particular hash function hs from Eve’s perspective
in terms of L1 distance from the uniform distribution, averaged over Eve’s possible knowledge
Y . If we average this distance over all possible seeds S ∈ SD, when the resulted value is sufficiently small, we can be certain that hs (X) is independent of random variables S and Y . Thus, the
generated random variable will be suitable even when we randomly choose the hash function.
In [63] it is shown that for 0 < α ≤ 1


α
α
Es d1 (Phs (X),Y |Y ) ≤ min 3M α+1 e− α+1 H1+α (X|Y ) ,
0<α≤1

where Es denotes expectation in terms of the random variable S. As a result, there exists a function
hs such that
α

d1 (Phs (X),Y |Y ) ≤ min 3e− α+1 (H1+α (X|Y )−log M ) .
0<α≤1

(4.30)

This equation implies that when equivocation of X is larger than the random number generation
rate, log M , distribution of the generated random variable hs (X) asymptotically approaches to uniformity. Consider our two layer secrecy scheme in which inverse of l-fold universal hash function
h(l) , using the same publicly known seed, maps a sequence of message blocks A(l) to a sequence of
plaintext blocks X (l) . We define decreasing exponent of L1 distance of generated secret messages
from uniform random numbers as
(l)

− log d1 (Ph(l) (X (l) ),Y (l) |Y (l) )
,
l→∞
l

e1 , lim

(4.31)

whose lower-bound can be characterized using Theorem 8:
Theorem 8. Let random variable A represent the message block of size b with components in the
set Ω where M = |Ωb |, and Q represent the cipher key. Then, for the proposed secrecy scheme with
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l-fold transmission mechanism, the secrecy exponent based on L1 distance satisfies:
(l)

α(H1+α (Q) + H1+α (A) − 2 log M )
.
0<α≤1
1+α

e1 ≥ max

(4.32)

Proof. At receiver l-fold universal hash function h(l) generates the message sequence A(l) that
belongs to the set I where |I| = |Ωb |l . By using Eq.’s (4.20) and (4.30) we write
α

d1 (Ph(l) (X (l) ),Y (l) |Y (l) ) ≤ min 3e− α+1 (H1+α (X
0<α≤1

(l) |Y (l) )−log |Ωb |l )

αl

b

= min 3e− α+1 (H1+α (X|Y )−log |Ω |) .
0<α≤1

For the random number generation rate of ρ = log M where M = |Ωb |, we can obtain decreasing
exponent of L1 norm based on its definition in Eq. (4.31) as
(l)

α(H1+α (X|Y ) − log M )
.
0<α≤1
1+α

e1 ≥ max

(4.33)

Random variable X represents the plaintext blocks that are generated by the inverse universal hash
operation and then encrypted using the cipher, giving them equivocation obtained in Eq. (4.25).
Substituting it in Eq. (4.33) completes the proof.
As a result, if we use the proposed key extractor to derive cipher keys, the same condition in
Eq. (4.27) needs to hold to have information leakage in terms of variational distance or Eve’s
distinguishability decay exponentially to zero.

4.6.3 Comparison Between Bounds and Metrics
First of all, we compare two bounds presented for the exponent of information leakage, one based
on mutual information in Eq. (4.22) and the other one based on L1 distance in Eq. (4.33). Mutual
information between two random variables X and Y can be written in terms of KL divergence
I(X; Y ) = D(PX,Y ||P̃X × PY ).

(4.34)

(l)

Hence, according to the definition of secrecy exponent eI in Eq. (4.18) we shall rewrite Eq. (4.22)
as
1
lim − log D(Ph(l) (X (l) ),Y (l) ||P̃h(l) (X (l) ) × PY (l) ) ≥ max α(H1+α (X|Y ) − log M ),
0<α≤1
l→∞
l
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(4.35)

so by using the property in Eq. (1.7), the exponent for L1 distance can be lower-bounded according
to
1
α(H1+α (X|Y ) − log M )
lim − log d1 (Ph(l) (X (l) ),Y (l) |Y (l) ) ≥ max
.
0<α≤1
l→∞
l
2

(4.36)

However, this bound is smaller than the lower-bound we used to characterize exponent of information leakage in terms of variational distance, implying that the bound in Eq. (4.33) is tighter than
the one for mutual information in Eq. (4.22). Moreover, these two bounds become equivalent when
α that maximizes the lower-bound in Eq. (4.33) is equal to 1.
On the other hand, If we compare these two metrics, based on the equivalence of mutual information and KL-distance and inequality (1.7), we infer that
1
log I(h(l) (X (l) ); Y (l) ) ≥ log d1 (Ph(l) (X (l) ),Y (l) |Y (l) ).
2

(4.37)

This inequality indicates that whenever system is secure from mutual information point of view,
and the left hand side is smaller than a sufficiently small number, the right hand side will also
be upper-bounded making information leakage in terms of variational distance negligible. Not to
mention that mutual information is a stronger metric compared to L1 distance. Nevertheless, the
main reason that makes variational distance a more suitable secrecy metric from cryptographic
perspective is that it simplifies formulation for practical analysis of any protocol environment and
can be augmented with practical notions of secrecy like Eve’s distinuishability.

4.7

Optimization and Analysis of dual mode transmission
mechanism

As discussed in previous sections the proposed secrecy scheme provides exponential secrecy if
privacy amplification is applied on top of the cipher with the stipulation on the key length that
is formulated in Eq. (4.27). It implies that there exists a trade-off such that exponential secrecy
that guarantees a higher level of secrecy requires a relatively high key rate. On the other hand,
only highly confidential part of the message requires exponential secrecy and a higher key rate,
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FIGURE 4.4. Dual mode transmission with two layers of secrecy

whereas normally it is not demanded in regular transmission. As a result, we design a dual mode
transmission mechanism depicted in Fig. 4.4 that, depending on the demanded level of secrecy for
transmission, switches to either encryption or privacy amplification (PA) mode.
For analysis, we consider special case with binary i.i.d. message source such that Ω = {0, 1}. For
regular and efficient transmission that does not require additional security, transmission mechanism
switches to encryption mode where input message is framed into n-bit blocks and then encrypted
by a cipher. For this layer of secrecy, we adopt Eve’s probability of failure in estimating the correct
plaintext block as the secrecy criterion. Such error probability was also considered as a metric to
measure security in [66, 68]. As discussed in Section 4.5 average block error probability of Eve
denoted by Pe exceeds the required threshold Peth if the required condition for the length of the
extracted key in Eq. (4.13) is satisfied.
In encryption mode each plaintext block is equivalent to n-bit message block. Let us represent
a plaintext block with random vector X ∈ {0, 1}n whose components Xi , for i = 1, . . . , n, are
independently and identically generated Bernoulli random variables with P r(Xi = 1) = p. It is
easy to see that X has Rényi entropy of
n
H1+α (X) = − log[p1+α + (1 − p)1+α ].
α

(4.38)

As a result, normalized redundancy of dX
α can be written according to Eq. (4.8) as
dX
α = log |Ω| +

1
log[p1+α + (1 − p)1+α ].
α
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(4.39)

Therefore, the minimum required key length for encryption mode given in Eq. (4.13) will be a
function of p, n, Peth , α and γ that we denote as Γe (p, n, Peth , α, γ).
As shown in Fig. 4.4 when a part of message requires a higher level of secrecy, transmission
mechanism switches to PA mode where the message source is encapsulated into b-bit blocks, and
then a sequence of l concatenated message blocks will be mapped to a sequence of plaintext blocks
using inverse universal hashing. In Section 4.6 we obtained the lower-bound for decreasing exponent of information leakage in Eq. (4.19) that has to be maximized in terms of the order of Rényi
entropy to have the highest possible decreasing rate for information leakage. Considering i.i.d. message source whose components are Bernoulli random variables with probability p, and extracted
cipher key whose entropy is given in Eq. (4.2), we can obtain the lower-bound for the decreasing
exponent as
GI (α, γ, p) = α(log |K| − 2 log M ) − e−αγ − b log[p1+α + (1 − p)1+α ],

(4.40)

where γ = δ − log |K|. We need to maximize GI (α, γ, p) with respect to α where 0 < α ≤
1. δ is the minimum entropy of the sampled data frame from which key Q was extracted. To
extract key we need to have γ > 0, i.e. for a larger k, larger δ would be needed. Therefore, in our
numerical analysis we make this assumption that γ takes a constant positive value. As a result, the
optimization problem can be formulated as
max GI (α, γ, p),

0<α≤1

where γ > 0 and GI (α, γ, p) > 0.

We use numerical optimization through an exhaustive search over 0 < α∗ ≤ 1 with the step size
of 10−4 , and denote the optimized order as α∗ and the maximized lower-bound as Gmax
I . As the
secrecy requirement for PA mode, we determine a threshold for secrecy exponent as Gth
I and find
≥ Gth
the minimum required cipher key length for which Gmax
I as
I
log |K| ≥


1
−α∗ γ
1+α∗
1+α∗
Gth
+
e
+
b
log[p
+
(1
−
p)
]
+ 2 log M.
I
α

∗
We denote this required lower-bound for key length in PA mode as Γpa (p, b, Gth
I , α , γ).
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(4.41)

FIGURE 4.5. Security rate in different modes with different metrics

Considering L1 norm distance as secrecy metric, according to Eq. (4.32), function G1 representing the lower bound for decreasing exponent of information leakage turns out to be
G1 (α, γ, p) =


1 
α(log |K| − 2 log M ) − e−αγ − b log[p1+α + (1 − p)1+α ] .
1+α

(4.42)

Similarly G1 can be maximized for 0 < α ≤ 1 and G1 > 0. Then, for optimized α∗ , if we
determine the required threshold for Gmax
as Gth
1
1 , we can obtain the requirement for the key length
to have Gmax
≥ Gth
1
1 as:
log |K| ≥

1
∗
∗ 
−α∗ γ
(1 + α)Gth
+ b log[p1+α + (1 − p)1+α ] + 2 log M.
1 +e
α

(4.43)

Let security rate be the minimum required key length for transmission of each message symbol
or bit with the required security. In encryption mode cipher keys are generated per message block of
length n-bit, hence security rate that meets the secrecy requirement is Γe (p, n, Peth , α, γ)/n. In PA
mode each generated key is applied per message block of length b-bit, therefore security rate will
be Γpa (b, α∗ , p, γ, Gth
I )/b. Fig. 4.5 depicts security rate in terms of varying Bernoulli parameter
0 < p < 0.5 for i.i.d. input binary distribution. It shows security rates that in PA mode satisfy
I
the required lower-bound for secrecy exponent based on mutual information (denoted by rpa
) or
1
variational distance (denoted by rpa
). It also illustrates security rate in encryption mode that is

denoted by re that meets the demanded block error rate for cryptanalyst. Gth
I is chosen to be 8 and
th
−4
Gth
1 is set to be half of it due to the inequality (4.37), meanwhile we select Pe to be 1 − 10 . The
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required security rate for PA mode is much higher than encryption mode. As can be seen, in PA
mode for p = 0.05 the required security rate is relatively high about 1.35 while with increase in p,
it goes down to 0.735. Note that the results obtained for both metrics in PA mode are almost the
same with slight differences for 0.05 < p < 0.3. That is because mutual information is a stronger
metric compared to L1 distance, and has a looser lower bound that will require a slightly higher
security rate to meet the secrecy requirement.
When both modes of operations are utilized in dual transmission mechanism, it is necessary to
simultaneously satisfy their demanded secrecy. That allows us to use the same key stream generation rate Rs defined as

log |K|
n

in both operational modes that needs to satisfy



∗
th
Rs ≥ max Γpa (p, b, Gth
I , α , γ), Γe (p, n, Pe , α, γ) /n.

Fig. 4.6 shows how required key stream rate for dual mode transmission varies with respect to
the parameter p of input binary distribution and conversion rate of inverse universal hashing (b/n).
Note that low conversion rate indicates that more redundancy is added through inverse hashing.
Exponential secrecy in PA mode is much stronger than the error probability metric in encryption
mode, so in most areas key length is determined by the secrecy criterion in PA mode. However,
in circled area the necessary key stream rate is determined based on the secrecy requirement of
encryption mode. That is because for low conversion rate (b is much smaller than n) and low
source entropy (low p) the required key length for strong secrecy of b-bit message in PA mode
might not be sufficient even for weak secrecy of n-bit message in encryption mode.

4.8

Conclusion

In this chapter we designed a secrecy system, based on a general cipher as the first layer and privacy amplification as the second layer, that is exponentially secure, namely, its information leakage
decays at exponential rate. Without resorting to any physical channel condition or restriction on
Eve’s resources, the only advantage that we considered for legitimate users was a key source that
is partially known by Eve. A key extracting module derives keys from this source about which
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FIGURE 4.6. Required key stream generation rate in dual mode transmission

Eve has the required uncertainty. We characterized and optimized the lower bound for decreasing
exponent of information leakage called secrecy exponent in terms of Eve’s information and distinguishability. Then, it is adopted as the criterion to determine the minimum required key length
for encryption. In numerical analysis we considered a dual mode transmission mechanism with
two levels of secrecy based on which the required key stream rate for different source entropies is
evaluated.
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Chapter 5
Future Work
5.1

Multiuser and Asynchronous Key Scheduling

In Chapter 3 we considered a protocol in which the legitimate users are 100% confident about the
shared randomness by utilizing the proposed synchronization scheme. However, in many applications there can be some synchronization errors between two parties, and since they both need
to apply a privacy amplification technique over the generated common randomness that can be
erroneous, the derived secret keys will be different that causes decryption error when these keys
are used for symmetric encryption. Moreover, approaches that require complete synchronization
between two parties will result in a higher communication overhead and lower secrecy throughput.
As a result, if we relax the requirement of absolute agreement between targeted recipient and the
transmitter by allowing bounded error pattern for shared data while still generating the same key,
we can achieve a secure key which consequently produces a higher secrecy throughput with a less
expenditure and overhead. Hence, we need to find a random extraction method, that with a similar
input but with a margin of difference from the original one, generates the same key. Moreover, the
effect of relaxed requirements in synchronization needs to be illustrated in improvement of system
efficiency.
In Chapter 3 to simplify the secrecy analysis problem, we assumed there exists a virtual oracle
giving Eve information regarding where she has lost her alignment with users. Nevertheless, for
rigorous analysis we should note that in reality there does not necessarily exist such an oracle,
so we will need to either adopt analysis based on a new metric or completely analyze possibility
of realignment. In addition, the mapping algorithm, that we proposed in this work to cause error
propagation for Eve, results in a constant distance between the original set and her destination set
after resynchronizations of her OTF with users’ set. If we assume that Eve is able to guess where

100

she has got back her OTF synchronization, she will be able to find this constant distance for the
rest of her destination set, remove it from her set and consequently obtain a set with a much lower
Hamming distance from the actual set and with a less entropy about the generated key. Therefore, a
new way of analysis and a new metric or some modification in generating the key and randomness
is required to address these issues with a more concrete analysis.
With increasing application of point to multipoint communication over broadcast links such as
file distribution, teleconferencing and video text systems, this trend will continue in future communications. Due to poor throughput efficiency of pure stop and wait ARQ protocols in systems where
channel round trip delay is large, and where there are a large number of receivers, they can not be
used in systems like satellite broadcast channels. In other words, if we try to extend our proposed
secrecy approach in Chapter 3 to broadcast communications, we will need to change it in a way that
can fit in the new channel conditions. Overall, a new or modified approach for generating secret
keys that tolerates a margin of errors between legitimate users and meanwhile generates a highly
secure key with a higher throughput is needed. This system should also be designed for sharing
secret keys between a base station and multiple users with a high secrecy and data efficiency.

5.1.1 Problem with the Proposed Mapping Strategy
In Chapter 3 we discussed about a mapping strategy based on the first order IIR filter that can be
used to map the generated OTF set into another set called destination set about which Eve will have
a higher uncertainty. Then, we can make sure that every missing or wrong OTF packet behaves like
an additive noise that propagates for the rest of packets in Eve’s destination set after misdetection.
The problem is that if we use first order mapping, every noisy packet will contribute with a constant
weight for the difference between Eve’s destination set and the original set. Accordingly, Eve
needs to simply estimate this constant difference and error between these two sets in order to
recover the original set. To prevent Eve from successfully mounting such kind of attack in guessing
possible packets that act like additive noise in her destination set, we may need to design a more
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sophisticated mapping strategy that minimizes the possibility of error estimation by Eve. In this
new mapping strategy we should take into account that misdetected packets should contribute with
varying weight in error propagation of Eve’s set to further intensify her confusion.

5.2

Proposed Approach

5.2.1 Asynchronous Key Agreement Based on Fuzzy Extractors and Edit
Distance
In [59] a key generation technique is proposed based on fuzzy extractors that extract a uniformly
random string R from its input w. This extraction is error-tolerant such that R will be the same
even when the input changes, as long as it remains within a certain distance from the original. To
assist in recovering R from w′ , fuzzy extractor produces a public string P . However, still given
P , R remains uniformly random. As a result, if we design our scheme in a way that with a fewer
transmissions or overheads, the distance between gathered random data for both partners is upperbounded, we can use fuzzy extractor to derive the same keys for them. Since fuzzy extractor tolerates errors within this upper-bound of distance between two inputs, with the help of public string
equivalent keys with a high min-entropy can be generated, to make sure that with a higher secret
key rate the required level of secrecy can be achieved.
If we consider possibility of errors in the proposed scheme in Chapter 3, every mistake in putting
a wrong packet in OTF or missing an OTF packet can cause a misalignment between two parties
and make the rest of their sets different. Thus, in this case it is not appropriate to use Hamming
distance as a metric to measure distance between two strings. We therefore need to tailor to a metric
that measures distance based on insertion and deletion of packets. In [59] Hamming distance, edit
distance as well as set difference are used to measure distance from the original input data. Edit
distance between w and w′ is defined to be one half of the smallest number of character insertions
and deletions needed to transform w into w′ . If we use edit distance instead of Hamming distance
to measure the difference between two gathered random strings by Alice and Bob, we do not need
to worry about asynchronization between them since what needs to be measured is the number of
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packets inserted or deleted to transform one set to another. In [59] a fuzzy extractor based on edit
distance is constructed that allows creation of the same keys when edit distance of two sets is less
than a threshold.
In this new context of using fuzzy extractors, we need to make sure that with a high probability
Eve’s gathered string will have a higher edit distance than the determined threshold. Due to using
a new difference metric, no longer can misalignment be a problem for Eve, yet what really matters
here is the number of mistakes that she probably makes by OTF packet missing or false OTF
packet error. Thus, the system has to be designed in a way that with a high probability the number
of Eve’s miss-detections exceeds the required upper-bound for edit distance with the original set,
to make sure that even with the use of public information she can not generate the same key.
This can be ensured by taking advantage of statistical independence between legitimate users and
adversary’s channels as well as an authenticated but insecure feedback channel between Bob and
Alice modeled as a binary erasure channel. Note that in this scenario there will not be any need for
a virtual oracle as it was assumed in Chapter 3 to analyze secrecy of the system.

5.2.2 More Efficient ARQ Protocols and Broadcasting Scenario
Stop and wait ARQ protocol that we utilized in our key management algorithm is not efficient in
real-life implementation and using it brings about a low throughput for communications. There are
some other more efficient ARQ protocols like Go-back-N and selective repeat ARQ. In Go-back-N
protocol, the transmitter continues sending a number of frames specified by a window size even
without receiving an ACK from receiver which generates a higher throughput compared to stop and
wait protocol. Selective repeat ARQ results in even a higher efficiency because unlike Go-back-N,
in this protocol after a lost frame, the sender continues to send a number of frames specified by its
window size, and the receiver accepts and acknowledges packets after a transmission error. If we
adopt either Go-back-N or selective repeat ARQ to achieve a higher transmission throughput in
our key scheduling scheme, OTF gathering strategies for Alice and Bob have to change, and a new
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secrecy analysis will be required. In this analysis, we need to take into account communication
efficiency and throughput, quality of secrecy (secrecy outage probability) and efficiency of secrecy
establishment (secret key rate). Furthermore, the trade-off between these metrics is needed to be
studied.
Another issue is how to extend ARQ based key scheduling to broadcasting scenario for the purpose of sharing keys between base station and users. In order to prevent disadvantages of using
simple ARQ in broadcast channels including throughput deficiency, we can utilize Hybrid ARQ
(HARQ) mechanism that takes advantage of both error detection and error correction to deliver a
higher throughput. In [101] different HARQ schemes are proposed to be used in broadcast channel that can provide acceptable throughput for the system. In [102] and [103] two different secure
HARQ schemes are presented that make use of the exiting potential in HARQ mechanism to improve security of the system by combining encoding and symmetric key encryption in one step
called secrecy encoder. As a result, instead of pure stop and wait protocol we used in Chapter
3, we can design a HARQ mechanism that along with a high secrecy efficiency, provides the required throughput over multiuser channel. Note that a new secrecy design and analysis for key
scheduling step is required since a new HARQ protocol is exploited by considering both error correction ability of HARQ and multiuser scenario. Then, the obtained secret keys can be utilized in
a well-designed secrecy encoding that is a secret-key-based randomized encoder to ensure reliability as well as highly confidential message transmission. In this scenario each user generates its
keys based on the statistical data obtained from HARQ mechanism when it is guaranteed that their
gathered data maintains its required edit distance from the original set through feedback messages
that is independently transmitted by each user.

5.2.3 New Non-Invertible Mapping Strategy
Let us consider a higher order IIR filter instead of a first order filter used for mapping OTF set into
a destination set. Let X(n) and W (n) be respectively the input OTF packet and output destination
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packet at time n. If for instance we consider a second order IIR filter with the following relationship
between input and output packets as
W (n) = b0 X(n) + b1 X(n − 1) + b2 X(n − 2) + a1 W (n − 1) + a2 W (n − 2),

(5.1)

the transfer function for this second order IIR filter can be written as
H(Z) =

B(Z)
b0 + b1 Z −1 + b2 Z −2
=
.
A(Z)
1 − a1 Z −1 − a2 Z −2

(5.2)

In this case the first output packet will be W (1) = b0 X(1) and the second one W (2) = b0 X(2) +
(b1 + a1 b0 )X(1). As can be seen, X(1) has weight b0 for W (1) and weight b1 + a1 b0 for W (2).
Namely, by using a higher order IIR filter we can infer that each input packet contributes with a
varying weight to each output packet. Basically, by using a higher order IIR filter we cause more
confusion for Eve such that she has to take a more sophisticated attack strategy rather than just
simply estimating an error that appears as a constant difference between her set and the original
set after misdetection. We should note that in case of using higher order IIR filter, we should also
take into account the issue of stability and make sure that coefficients of this transfer function are
designed in a way that stability is guaranteed.
If a higher order IIR filter is used as mapping strategy, Eve needs to first deal with the ambiguity
problem to know where errors have occurred and then estimate error sequence in her set. If we
consider that each misdetected packet acts like an additive noise in Eve’s destination set, in case
of using a higher order IIR filter, it is like this additive noise goes through a channel with transfer
function of the utilized digital filter. As a result, a possible attack strategy would be applying inverse
mapping in order to estimate this noise and to recover the original OTF packets. In this strategy
Eve models these misdetected packets in her OTF set as additive noise that goes through this filter.
Therefore, she can use some estimation techniques like Kalman filter or MMSE (Minimum Mean
Square Error) to estimate the existing error in her destination set and then to apply inverse mapping
in order to find the original packet errors in her guessed OTF set.
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As a possible approach, if we design A(Z) and B(Z) in denominator and nominator of the filter
transfer function as feedback and feedforward filters to control their coefficients, we can have a
mapping strategy that is invertible impossible. By adopting this non-invertible mapping, we ensure
that Eve will not be able to apply inverse operation to estimate the original packet errors. Namely,
singularity in mapping obstructs Eve from estimating original errors in her OTF set. Moreover,
since Eve is not able to directly communicate with Alice, it is not possible for her to resolve this
singularity problem. On the other hand, Bob can communicate with Alice and use reconciliation
strategy or, in case of using fuzzy extractor, utilize received helper string to correct possible errors
in her gathered OTF set. This two-way communication guarantees that singularity in mapping will
not cause any problem for legitimate users such that they can be confident of generating the same
OTF sets that later on will be mapped to the same destination sets resulting in exactly the same
secret keys after universal hashing.

5.2.4 Novelty
The most important innovation in this work is using fuzzy extractors in order to allow some margin of difference between generated random sets in the receiver and transmitter measured with
edit distance. This allows us to design a system with less required overhead and thus increased
secrecy throughput. Meanwhile, it will make secrecy analysis of the system more straightforward
by removing the necessity to have an oracle and focusing on only the number of miss-detections
by Eve. On the other hand, using a higher order IIR filtering that is singular prohibits Eve from
applying inverse mapping in order to estimate her original packet errors unlike the previously proposed mapping that allows her to just estimate original errors that appear as a constant difference
between her set and the original set.
Another novelty of this proposed scheme is extending the key scheduling algorithm proposed in
Chapter 3 to broadcast channels by utilizing efficiency of the application of HARQ transmission
mechanism. We can also utilize potentiality of HARQ to design a secure HARQ by converting
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its pure encoder into a secrecy encoder providing both error correction and security based on the
generated key stream in previous transmissions. The new analysis for both secrecy outage rate and
secrecy throughput will be required for the newly designed scheme in the multiuser framework.
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Chapter 6
Appendix
6.1

Proof of Theorem 2

Proof. Suppose that all possible 256−a key candidates are arranged as k1 , k2 , . . . , k256−a from the
lowest rank to the highest. Let Hi be the hypothesis that ki is the original key and gi = 1 be the
event that Eve decides that ki is correct. We define a Bernoulli random variable B which is equal to
1 when the right key is among top 256−a candidates, and 0, otherwise. Thus, P r[B = 0] = 1 − Ps
and P r[B = 1] = Ps . Let Pc be the total success probability for Eve. Note that when B = 0, the
right key will not be tested and consequently can not be found. Therefore, we have
Pc =

56−a
2X

i=1

P r[gi = 1, Hi |B = 1].P r[B = 1].

(6.1)

The probability that Eve can realize the right key ki is
P r[gi = 1, Hi |B = 1] = P r[gi = 1|Hi , B = 1].P r[Hi |B = 1].
For Eve to be able to find the correct key at rank i, since she starts the test from upper ranks to the
lower ones, there should not be any false key acceptance for ranks higher than i, as well as a key
missing event for rank i. Hence,
56−a −i

P r[gi = 1|Hi , B = 1] = (1 − PF )2

(1 − Pm ).

(6.2)

Moreover, Decisions about all 256−a keys are independent, and all of the tested keys are equally
probable to be the right one, i.e. P r[Hi |B = 1] =

1
.
256−a

Therefore, by using Eq.’s (6.1) and (6.2),

we obtain Eq. (2.8) for total success probability.
The next step is to compute the frame erasure probability. Assume that the right key is ki and
is located among top 256−a candidates. In order to obtain no key, Eve should not have any false
key admission for kj , j 6= i for i, j = 256 − 256−a + 1, . . . , 256 , i.e. top 256−a candidates except
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the right key itself, and in addition to that she has to miss the right key ki . When ki is not among
top candidates, since it will not be examined, Eve gets nothing provided that there has been no
wrong key acceptance event for top 256−a tested candidates. As a result, frame erasure probability
can be computed according to Eq. (2.9). By a similar technique, we can prove that the wrong key
probability is Pw = 1 − Pe − Pc .

6.2

Proof of Lemma 3

Proof. We need to compute vector transition probabilities between all possible input and output
vectors X and Y for states S1 and S3 . Hence, for k = 1, 3
P r[Y |X, Sk ] = P r[X ⊕ Y |X, Sk ] = P r[E|Sk ],

(6.3)

where E is the decryption error vector which is bit-wise Xor of input and output vectors. The last
equality is because E depends on channel errors in previous and current ciphertexts, so given the
state, it is independent from input vector X. To analyze states S0 and S1 , we define two events, A
and B as
A:

There exists at least one bit error in

Ĉi

B:

There exists at least one bit error in

Ĉi−1 .

As a result, S1 = A ∩ B̄, and we can write
P r(E|S1 ) =P r(E|A, B̄) =

P r(E|B̄)P r(A|E, B̄)
.
P r(A|B̄)

(6.4)

The fact that events A and B are caused by two independent channel error vectors Zi−1 and
Zi implies that A is independent of B and its complementary, i.e. P r(A|B̄) = P r(A) = q. When
event B has not occurred, since only Ĉi can induce bit errors with rate of η into the stored plaintext,
the probability that a particular decryption error vector E with Hamming weight of W (E) takes
place will be
P r(E|B̄) = η W (E) (1 − η)64−W (E) .
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(6.5)

In state S1 , HW of error vector E can not be zero because we know that the only source that
can induce error at stage i is Zi that surely has a non-zero bit. In this case, given an error vector
E with W (E) 6= 0 and knowing that event B did not occur, we can infer that this error is induced
by error in Ĉi , hence event A has certainly occurred, i.e. P r(A|E, B̄) = 1. Thus, using equations
(6.3), (6.4) and (6.5), we can obtain the input-output transition probability in S1 as in Eq. (2.12).
Similarly, for state S3 , P r(Y |X, S3 ) can be computed with the detailed proof provided in our
technical report [104].

6.3

Proof of Lemma 4

Proof. If we assume that all 264 possible input plaintexts are equally likely, for l = 1, 3 we can
write
H(Y |Sl , X) = −

XX 1
P r(Y = Yj |X = Xi , Sl ). log P r(Y = Yj |X = Xi , Sl )
64
2
i
j
64

=−

2
X
j=1

P r(E = Ej |Sl ) log P r(E = Ej |Sl ).

(6.6)

The second equality is resulted from Eq. (6.3) for Ei,j = Xi ⊕ Yj as the decryption error vector.
Furthermore, for state S1 as discussed in subsection 2.4.1, HW of the error vector E can not be
zero. Thus, we can take E1 as a 64-bit zero vector and exclude it from this summation. Then, using
Eq. (2.12) brings about the following result

 W (Ej )
264
−1 X W (Ej )
η
(1 − η)64−W (Ej )
64−W (Ej )
H(Y |S1 , X) =
.
η
(1 − η)
. log
q j=2
q

(6.7)

We know that out of all 264 error vectors, the number of possible vectors with HW of W is the
number of possibilities of choosing W bits out of 64 bits which is equal to W -combinations from
64 elements. Finally, Eq. (6.7) can be rewritten as Eq. (2.18) by excluding k = 0. For state S3 , we
compute H(Y |S3 , X) using Eq. (6.6) for l = 3. In this case, j = 1 is not excluded because unlike
state S1 in state S3 , it is possible to have decryption error vector E1 with zero weight. Thus, by
using Eq. (2.13), we obtain H(Y |S3 , X) in Eq. (2.19).
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6.4

Proof of Theorem 3

i
Proof. Let Em
and eim be the random variables Em and em , respectively, associated with one-

time transmission and feedback reception of packet i by Bob. Also, let Ewi and eiw be the random
variables Ew and ew , associated with one-time transmission and feedback reception of packet iE
by Eve. We assume that transmission of each packet and its associated feedback is independent
for different packets while their corresponding events of correct receptions or failures for different
i
packets are equally likely. Thus, at final steps of the following proofs we can replace Em
, eim , Ewi

and eiw with Em , em , Ew and ew , respectively. Eq. (3.6) can be rewritten as
1
P r[H1 |FiE , Ewi = 0] > .
2

(6.8)

Since hypothesis H1 occurs when Fi = 1 and packet i is received correctly by Bob, using Bayesian
rule we get
i
i
P r[H1 |FiE , Ewi = 0] = P r[Fi = 1|Em
= 0, Ewi = 0, FiE ]P r[Em
= 0, FiE |Ewi = 0].

(6.9)

In this Eq. since the erasure in the received feedback by Bob, i.e. Fi , is independent from the
erasure in Eve’s received packet, the first term can be written
i
= 0, FiE ] =
P r[Fi = 1|Em

i
P r[Fi = 1, FiE |Em
= 0]
.
i
P r[FiE |Em = 0]

(6.10)

First of all, we consider the case where Eve has received feedback FiE = 1. Then, the second term
in Eq. (6.9) will be one because receiving feedback FiE = 1 by Eve implies that it was initially
received error-free by Bob. By using Eq. (6.10), we can rewrite the first term in Eq. (6.9) as
i
P r[Fi = 1|Em
= 0, FiE = 1] =

i
q00
1 − η − θ + q11
P r[eim = 0, eiw = 0|Em
= 0]
=
=
.
i
i
P r[ew = 0|Em = 0]
1−θ
1−θ

(6.11)
The second equality is resulted from the definition of joint backward erasure probabilities. The
third equality comes from relationships q00 + q01 = P r[eim = 0] = 1 − η and q01 + q11 = P r[eiw =
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1] = θ, with q11 given in Eq. (3.4). Thus, by Eq’s (6.9) and (6.11), we can write the decision rule
(6.8) as
"

#
p
ηθ(1 − η)(1 − θ)
1
1−η+
− > 0.
1−θ
2
ψ

(6.12)

This is equivalent to Γ > 0 as it was defined in (3.7).
Next, suppose that Eve has received an erased feedback FiE = e. Due to independence of the
packet reception by Bob and feedback reception by Eve, we can show that the second term of Eq.
(6.9) will be
i
P r[Em
= 0|Ewi = 0] =

i
P r[Em
= 0, Ewi = 0]
p00
1 − δ − ε + p11
=
=
.
i
P r[Ew = 0]
1−ε
1−ε

(6.13)

Similarly, by Eq. (6.10), the first term in Eq. (6.9) will be
i
P r[Fi = 1|Em
= 0, FiE = e] =

θ − q11
.
θ

(6.14)

Now by replacing Eq.’s (6.13) and (6.14) into Eq. (6.9), we can get the decision rule in Eq. (6.8) as
"
#"
#
p
p
ρ εδ(1 − δ)(1 − ε)
ψ ηθ(1 − η)(1 − θ)
1
1−δ+
(6.15)
1−η−
− > 0.
1−ε
θ
2
According to the definition of Λ in (3.8), it is equivalent to the decision rule Λ > 0 for FiE = e.

6.5

Proof of Lemma 5

Proof. According to the definition of OTF packet missing probability, by using Bayesian rule we
have
Pm =P r[iE 6∈ OTFE |H1 ]

(6.16)

=P r[iE 6∈ OTFE |H1 , FiE = 1, Ewi = 0]P r[FiE = 1, Ewi = 0|H1 ]
+P r[iE 6∈ OTFE |H1 , FiE = e, Ewi = 0]P r[FiE = e, Ewi = 0|H1 ]
+P r[iE 6∈ OTFE |H1 , Ewi = 1]P r[Ewi = 1|H1 ],
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where OTFE denotes Eve’s chosen OTF set, and ‘Ewi = 1’ means Eve did not receive iE correctly.
i
By definition, H1 is equivalent to the event [eim = 0, Em
= 0], so we have
i
P r[FiE = 1, Ewi = 0|H1 ] = P r[eiw = 0|eim = 0]P r[Ewi = 0|Em
= 0]

=

q00
p00
1 − η − θ + q11 1 − δ − ε + p11
.
=
.
,
1−η 1−δ
1−η
1−δ

(6.17)

where p11 and q11 are given in Eq. (3.4). Similarly, we can show
P r[FiE = e, Ewi = 0|H1 ] =

(θ − q11 )[1 − δ − ε + p11 ]
.
(1 − η)(1 − δ)

(6.18)

We can compute the last term in Eq. (6.16) as
i
P r[Ewi = 1|Em
= 0, Fi = 1] =

ε − p11
.
1−δ

(6.19)

For a correctly received packet by Eve, with the received feedback as FiE = 1, she will not put
packet iE into OTFE if Γ < 0. If FiE = e, iE will not belong to Eve’s OTF if Λ < 0. Apparently,
when ‘Ewi = 1’, regardless of what the received feedback would be, she has no way to put iE in
OTFE . Hence,
P r[iE 6∈ OT FE |H1 , FiE = 1, Ewi = 0] = 1(Γ<0)
P r[iE 6∈ OT FE |H1 , FiE = e, Ewi = 0] = 1(Λ<0)
P r[iE 6∈ OT FE |H1 , Ewi = 1] = 1.

(6.20)

By replacing Eq.’s (6.17)-(6.20) into Eq. (6.16), we can get the formula for Pm in Eq. (3.9).
To compute the false OTF probability which is PF = P r[iE ∈ OTF|H0 ], we split hypothesis
H0 into two events: H01 when packet i is received incorrectly by Bob, and H02 when i is received
without error, but Fi = e. It should be noted that according to Eve’s strategy, false detection event
only occurs when SRiE = 0 and PiE +1 6= PiE because she only cares about fresh packets. We
define PF1 as the false OTF probability when H01 takes place, which is
PF1 =P r[iE ∈ OTF|H01 ]

(6.21)

=P r[iE ∈ OTF|H01 , FiE = e, Ewi = 0]P r[FiE = e, Ewi = 0|H01 ].
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That is because when H01 occurs, since Bob has not decoded i correctly, he will send back a Nack
which can be received either erased bit or zero that in the latter case Eve will certainly not put it
into OTF. According to Eve’s strategy in Tab. 3.4, for a correctly received packet iE once receiving
FiE = e, Eve puts iE into OTF if Λ > 0, so
P r[iE ∈ OTF|H01 , FiE = e, Ewi = 0] = 1(Λ>0) .

(6.22)

Moreover, the erasure event in the received feedback by Eve is independent of the reception of
packet iE and i. As a result, the second term in Eq. (6.21) will be
i
i
P r[FiE = e, Ewi = 0|Em
= 1]P r[eiw = 1] =
= 1] = P r[Ewi = 0|Em

p10
(δ − p11 )θ
θ=
. (6.23)
δ
δ

Therefore, we have
PF1 = 1(Λ>0)

(δ − p11 )θ
.
δ

(6.24)

We also define PF2 as the false OTF probability when H02 occurs. We can similarly show that
PF2 =

[1(Λ>0) q11 + 1(Γ>0) (η − q11 )](1 − δ − η + p11 )
.
η(1 − δ)

(6.25)

Now, we can obtain the total false OTF probability as
PF =PF1 P r[H01 ] + PF2 P r[H02 ] = PF1 δ + PF2 (1 − δ)η,
replacing PF1 , PF2 from Eq.’s (6.24), (6.25) completes the proof.

6.6

Proof of Theorem 4

Proof. Let Xi denote the packets in OTF for i = 1, . . . , nts , and Yi indicate the packets in Eve’s
OTF. We denote the number of Alice and Bob’s Bernoulli trials between i − 1st and ith successes
in putting in OTF as Ti . Ti ’s are i.i.d. random variables with geometric distribution. Let Ne denote
the number of mismatches between two destination sets. Outage probability is defined as the probability that there exists less than l packet discrepancies between two destination sets that occurs
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when there is at least nts − l + 1 packets to be the same for V and W . It means that misalignment
would happen after nts − l + 1th packet in OTFE . Hence, we have,
(1)

Pout =P r(Ne < l) = P r[Xi = Yi , i ∈ {1, . . . , nts − l + 1}]
(2)

=

ntsY
−l+1

P r[Xi = Yi ]

i=1

(3)

=

(4)

≤

(5)

=

Pi−1
j=1 Tj
ntsY
−l+1 M −X

t=1
i=1
ntsY
−l+1 X
M

t=1
i=1
ntsY
−l+1 X
M
i=1


(6)
≤

t=1

P r[Xi = Yi |Ti = t]P r[Ti = t]

P r[Xi = Yi |Ti = t]P r[Ti = t]

(1 − Pm )(1 − PF )t−1 Pc (1 − Pc )t−1

(1 − Pm )Pc
1 − (1 − Pc )(1 − PF )

nts −l+1

.

(6.26)

Equality (2) is because the decision that receiver makes about each packet is independent of other
packets. Equality (3) is based on Bayesian rule by summing over all possible number of trials for
each Bernoulli success. For the first success it can reach to the total number of packets within the
frame, i.e. M , but for the next ones, we should subtract the number of all previous trials. Equality
(5) holds since to have Xi = Yi , neither should there be missing OTF event for Eve for packet Xi
at the ith Bernoulli success nor any false detection event for the rest of unsuccessful OTF Bernoulli
events that are totally Ti − 1 trials. Conclusively, inequalities (4) and (7) show that Eq. (3.13)
provides an upper-bound for Pout .

6.7

Universality of ⊙ multiplication in GF(q n)

Proof. We first prove Condition 1 of universality for the function hs defined as h(S, X) = truncb [S⊙
X]. For the collision probability of this function we can write
h
i
P r[S ∈ SD : h(S, X) = h(S, X ′ )] = P r S ∈ SD, ∃R ∈ Ωn−b \0n−b : S ⊙ (X ⊕ X ′ ) = (0b , R)
≤ (q n−b − 1)

qn
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1
1
≤ b.
−1
q

Since X ⊕ X ′ 6= 0, we can find at most one S ∈ Ωn \0n for which S ⊙ (X ⊕ X ′ ) = (0b , R) with
R 6= 0. The last inequality holds since for a ≤ b we have

a−1
b−1

≤ ab .

For the second condition consider a randomly chosen S. We can see that h−1 (R, S, A) = S −1 ⊙
(A||R) is uniformly distributed over the preimage set XA = {X ∈ Ωn , h(X, S) = A} which has
n−b
cardinality of q n−b , implying that |h−1
. That is because a uniformly chosen R over
s (A)| = q

the set Ωn−b determines which X ∈ XA generates (A||R) after multiplication by S. There exists
q b such preimage sets that are disjoint and have cardinality that does not depend on A. Contrarily,
if there exists an element in both XA and XA′ with A 6= A′ , it means that S −1 ⊙ (A||R) =
S −1 ⊙ (A′ ||R′ ). For R 6= R′ it is impossible to hold, but for R = R′ it requires that A = A′ which
n−b
is contradictory. Therefore, |h−1
which does not depend on A.
s (A)| = |XA | = q

6.8

Proof of Theorem 5

Proof. It is sufficient to prove that the statement holds for Es H1+α (Q), where Es denotes the
expectation over S. Then, we can find a function hs for which the inequality (4.2) holds. Due to
convexity of the function

−1
α

log(.) for α > 0, we can write

Es H1+α (hs (X)) = Es

X
−1
log
P r[hs (x)]1+α
α
hs (x)

≥

X
−1
log Es
P r[hs (x)]1+α .
α

(6.27)

hs (x)

Where x is a realization of random variable X. We can rewrite the right hand side as
X

hs (x)

P r[hs (x)]α+1 =

X

P r[hs (x) = ζ]P r[hs (x′ ) = hs (x) = ζ]α

ζ

where ζ is a realization of random variable Q. If condition 2 of universality holds for the ensemble
of functions hs , it implies that preimages of different ζ’s (i.e. h−1
s (ζ)) are distinct. Therefore, taking
expectation over random variable Q is equivalent to averaging over X. For the second term in this
equation the probability of occurrence of a particular ζ is equivalent to finding probability of its
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preimage, so we have
X

P r[hs (x)]α+1 =

X
x

hs (x)

=

X
x

According to this equation we can state that
Es

X

α
P r(X = x)P r[h−1
s (ζ)]

P r[hs (x)]α+1 =

≤

PX (x) 

X

x′ :hs (x′ )=hs (x)



X

PX (x)Es 

X

PX (x) Es

x

hs (x)



x



PX (x′ ) .

X

1

PX (x′ ) =

PX (x′ )

X

PX (x′ ) .

x′ :hs (x′ )=hs (x)

x′ :hs (x′ )=hs (x)

2

≥

α

(6.28)

X

P r(S = S ′ ) [P r(x′ = x) + P r(hs (x′ ) = hs (x)|x′ 6= x)]

X

Ps (S)[PX (x) +

S

x′ :hs (x′ )=hs (x)

α

X

The last inequality is due to concavity of f (x) = xα for 0 < α ≤ 1.
Es

α

S

1
1 3
] = PX (x) +
.
|K|
|K|

(6.29)

Inequality 2 is resulted from the universality property of the family of hash functions hs that maps
Ω to the set of size |K|. The equality 3 holds since the random variable S is uniform randomly
distributed. We know that for 0 < α ≤ 1 we have (x + y)α ≤ xα + y α . Therefore


1
PX (x) +
K

α

≤ PX (x)α +

1
.
Kα

substituting Eq.’s (6.28)-(6.30) into Eq. (6.27) results in
Es H1+α (hs (X)) ≥
=
=
=



X
1
−1
α
log
PX (x) PX (x) +
α
|K|α
x
#
"
X
1
−1
log
PX (x)1+α +
α
|K|α
x


−1
1
−αH1+α (X)
log e
+
α
|K|α


1
1
log |K|α − log 1 + eα(log |K|−H1+α (X)) .
α
α
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(6.30)

Finally, using the inequality log(1 + x) ≤ x and the facts that hs (X) = Q and H1+α (X) ≥ δ
proves the statement for Es H1+α (Q) and hence for Eq. (4.2).

6.9

Proof of Lemma 6

Proof. Based on the definition of the Shannon and Rényi entropy we shall write
X
X
−1 X
PY (y) log
PX|Y (x|y)1+α −
PY (y) log PY (y)
α y
x
y
"
#
X
−1 X
=
PY (y) log
PX|Y (x|y)1+α + α log PY (y)
α y
x
#
"
X
X
−1
PX|Y (x|y)1+α .
log PY (y)α
=
PY (y)
α
x
y

H1+α (X|Y ) + H(Y ) =

For α > 0,

−1
α

log(.) is a convex function, so by using Jensen’s inequality it can be concluded that
!
X
X
−1
α+1
α+1
H1+α (X|Y ) + H(Y ) ≥
log
PX|Y (x|y)
PY (y)
α
x
y
=

X
−1
log
PX,Y (x, y)α+1 = H1+α (X, Y ).
α
x,y
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